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Abstract: In the age of the administrative state, the battle over who controls the federal
bureaucracy and the rulemaking process decides much of the direction of American public
policy. The president has emerged from this milieu as the strongest political actor in the
administrative state because of their ability to leverage political appointees and the centralized
EOP to protect their agenda from entrepreneurial bureaucrats and a rivalrous Congress. Yet, little
is known about the effectiveness of political appointees as a tool of presidential control outside
of case studies of individual agencies in the large federal bureaucracy. Using data from the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to create new, generalizable variables of
presidential control, I run logistic and OLS regressions to test whether political appointees are
able to effectively promote the president’s agenda. I find that political appointees do increase the
presidents control over the rulemaking process as well as a relationship between centralization
and politicization as substitutes. These findings have significant implications for how we
understand democratic accountability and the continued competence of the bureaucracy.
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In November, 2019, Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos announced a new set of rules
that will reshape how Title IX adjudicates cases of sexual misconduct on college campuses.
Under the finalized rules, sexual misconduct will now be defined as “unwelcome conduct on the
basis of sex that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it denies a person access
to the school’s education program or activity,” a stark departure from the Obama-era guidelines
that defined harassment as “unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature” (Green 2018a). Moreover,
the new rules will allow the survivor to be cross-examined and permit schools to choose whether
to continue to use a “preponderance of evidence” standard or switch to a “clear and convincing”
policy (Meckler 2019; Green 2018a). The impetus for this large swing in policy did not from the
career civil servants within the Department, but from the political appointees of the President and
his party which described the previous rules a “distortion of Title IX” that “contravenes our
country’s legal traditions and must be halted” (Republican Party Platform 2016; North 2019).
These rules seem to be an active choice by Secretary DeVos and the President to use the
Department of Education to prioritize the rights of students accused of sexual assault and make it
more difficult for survivors to bring cases.
These changes will leave thousands of cases of sexual harassment and assault either
unreported or uninvestigated every year. A Department of Education analysis when the rules
were first proposed found that that sexual harassment investigations would fall by 39 percent in
colleges and universities and by 50 percent in elementary and secondary school districts (Green
2018b).1 This decrease is not because of spontaneously fewer incidents, rather the new definition
of sexual misconduct will prevent formal investigations of previous cases which were previously
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While the analysis was conducted upon an earlier draft of the rules which removed even more protections for survivors
of sexual assault, the final rules issued are largely the same as that draft. (North, 2019; Meckler, 2019; New York Times,
2019).
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classified as such. The potential to be cross-examined will only further increase the personal cost
of filing a complaint and the new standard of evidence will make convictions far harder to attain.
These technical changes to definitions and standards will change the lives of Americans across
the country, yet they did not come from a traditional political actor.
This new set of rules governing sexual assault was not written in a bill passed by
Congress, a judicial ruling from a Supreme Court justice, or an executive order from the
president, but rather by civil servant in a public sector agency. Agencies and bureaus—terms that
I will use interchangeably in the piece—make up an expansive network of nondemocratic
organizations that oversee and administer the statutes that Congress writes and the president
signs into law. This is the American bureaucracy and the unelected civil servants within are our
bureaucrats. Congress rarely writes a law specific enough to be applied as written and so they
delegate authority to agencies to design rules and regulations—synonymous terms in this
context—which fill in the details needed to apply those statues. The 1946 Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) defines a rule as any “agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to…interpret, or prescribe law or policy”
[U.S.C §551(4)(1994)]. In 2015, there were about 30 new rules issued for every piece of
legislation passed by Congress, and Warren (2010) estimates that rules make up over 90% of the
legal code that governs American life (Crews 2016b, Yackee, 2019). Rules are essential to fill in
the gaps and ambiguities in legislation, but they also present political opportunities to
nontraditional political actors like bureaucrats, as well as elected officials to change the meaning
of bills that have already been signed into law.
Despite the common narrative of a Congressional driven policy process, the president’s
battle with bureaucrats to control the rulemaking process has taken over the policy process. To
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do so a constitutionally-weak presidency has strengthened its existing powers and created new
ones in an attempt to control the bureaucracy, capitalizing upon the potential political power that
comes with controlling the rules and regulations that dictate the how laws interact with society.
The president has been able to use the bureaucratic discretion built into laws to move their
institutional conflict with Congress to an arena where she has the upper hand. The president has
done so by taking advantage of the uncertainties within laws that have created space in which
Congress, the president, and bureaucrats have strategically maneuvered to dictate rules and
regulations.
Title IX’s vague standards of evidence and definitions of discrimination have created an
arena in which traditional political actors and career civil servants have battled for control over
the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) within the Department of Education to protect their own
priorities in the implementation of the law. Congress passed Title IX in 1972 on a voice vote
with little controversy just a few months after they had passed the Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA). The central mandate of Title IX asserts that no person, on the basis of sex, shall be
denied access to, the benefits of, or be discriminated under any education program or activity
funded in part by federal money. While it was modeled on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, regulators and policymakers quickly discovered that gender discrimination in education
could not solved simply by replacing “race” with “sex” in a new statute. As a result, exceptions
for certain types of schools and separate living conditions were carved into the law, creating
ambiguity that never existed for race over what constituted discrimination (Melnick 2018 ).
Furthermore, Congress expressly stated that Title IX did not call for affirmative action, yet still
allowed statistical evidence of different rates of participation to be used as evidence of
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discrimination (Tani 2016). Without clear standards of what discrimination was or how to prove
it in the law itself, whatever actor could control OCR would define the reach of Title IX.
In line with the traditional narrative of Congressional management of the bureaucracy,
Congress built mechanisms of control into the legislation itself and used additional legislation to
translate its preferences into formal rules. Most prominently, Congress passed the 1987 Gove
City Bill, which clarified that entire school districts or colleges would lose federal funding if a
program within was found in violation of Title IX after a Supreme Court decision ruled that only
funding to the specific transgressing program within either could be cut. If Congress did not want
to pass a bill dedicated to amending Title IX, it could also make active changes to Title IX
through riders on appropriations bills. Additionally, Congress placed two procedural safe guards
in Title IX to protect their interests: mandatory presidential approval and a congressional veto.
Congress checked presidential influence by requiring that all regulations be individually
approved and signed by the president, ensuring that the president had to take political
responsibility for any rule issued by OCR. In theory, a president who has to actively attach their
name and reputation to a rule will be less likely to advance extreme positions outside the scope
of the law for fear of political backlash. Moreover, that president is likely to act as a check on
entrepreneurial bureaucrats whose own agenda may not align with those of the president. The
congressional veto is a more straightforward mechanism of control over policy; it allows
Congress to veto any new regulation with votes from both chambers without presidential
agreement. These kinds of structural controls built into a law’s basic framework in addition to its
legislative powers are two of several ways Congress tries to supervise the rules making process
(Shapiro 2007).
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However, Congressional control over Title IX quickly began to crumble as their various
methods proved to be either ineffective or unconstitutional. It began when the Supreme Court
ruled the Congressional veto provision unconstitutional, leaving Congress with only its
traditional legislative powers to actively control enforcement. While members continued to
attach riders on omnibus education or appropriations bills, no rider has ever actually passed and
Congress has lacked the consensus or will to pass new legislation changing Title IX since the
Grove City Bill in 1987 (Melnick 2018). Unable to overcome political inertia or build a
consensus, the majority of Congress’ influence on Title IX would prove to be in the original
writing of the bill as the president and bureaucrats have driven the subsequent changes to
enforcement, seemingly unconstrained by the presidential approval procedure.
With Congress unable or unwilling to clarify the definition of discrimination or the
proper standards of enforcement, the president and the career civil servants within OCR stepped
into the void left by Congress and began to implement their own priorities. In fact, the most
significant periods of growth in Title IX regulations have come when presidents have lost their
congressional majorities and faced stagnation in their legislative agenda (1994-2000 and 20102016). In each case, this regulatory growth advanced the political goals of the president and set
back those of the congressional majority (Republican Party Platform 2016 and Melnick 2018).
As a result, over the past fifty years, Title IX has shifted shapes and reach—expanding and then
contracting across college athletics, sexual harassment, and transgender right—responding as it
met advocates or resistance in the White House or OCR itself, but rarely in Congress.
In this new political arena the president has been the decisive figure, but civil servants
have impeded the full implementation of some presidential priorities. Early in OCR’s history, the
civil servants within worked to implement the policy priorities of the bureau and its employees
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rather than those of the president. Political appointees repeatedly struggled to implement the
president’s agenda; as President Ford’s Health, Education, and Welfare Secretary, David
Mathews, described OCR to his successor, “that place is a law unto itself. You will find OCR
takes major actions without informing you. It even attacks you in the press, attacks the
Secretary” (Melnick 2018). That same successor would later complain that OCR lacked any
loyalty to or identification with the political leadership of the department. Few of the around 550
employees of OCR are political appointees and the regional and field offices are entirely made
up of civil servants. While the general institutional culture of OCR has favored Democratic
administration’s priorities, presidents of both parties have struggled to control its bureaucrats and
civil servants have historically tried to establish and maintain a level autonomy to implement
their own preferences over those of the president (Melnick 2018).
To overcome this bureaucratic resistance, presidents have primarily pushed their
priorities through OCR with the political appointees that lead the bureau. The process of
embedding loyal presidential appointees deep into the fabric of an agency is called politicization.
These presidential appointees became powerful driving forces of OCR action after the OCR was
moved to the smaller Department of Education and its administrator became the appointed
Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights. Since this 1980 reorganization, OCR has largely been in
lock-step with the Secretary of Education as well as the White House staff—especially under the
Obama administration (Johnson and Taylor 2017). Some Republican administrations have had
less success controlling lower-level officials, but that is largely due to their strategy of relaxing
regulatory oversight to deregulate rather than formally rewriting the rules. For the most part, the
Assistant Secretaries have been able to control the policy guidelines that OCR promulgates as
well the bureau’s general enforcement strategy (Melnick 2018). The appointees, however, are
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limited by the accumulated precedents set previously by OCR as well as the complaint
processing routine that defines OCR’s institutional culture (Melnick 2018). So while the
presidential appointees have the authority to enact presidential preferences, they are constrained
by the history and culture of the institution they are inserted into.
In response to these limitations, presidents can also try to centralize the authority and
duties of OCR or other federal agencies within the Executive Office of the President (EOP) or
the White House staff to ensure that their agenda is advanced. While no president has yet to
directly move the role of the OCR into the White House, they have used another form of
centralized authority to oversee any rules published: regulatory review through the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). OIRA review gives the president an opportunity to
propose changes or outright reject individual rules produced by agencies. Regulatory review is a
more direct form of executive control, but also requires greater political resources than
appointing a subordinate and being able to trust that they will produce favorable results. Just like
in any office, competent aides are more efficient than micromanagement.
Given these two avenues for executive control, presidents are likely to choose whichever
one is more effective at a lower cost. On one hand, centralized functions cost more political
capital, but ensure greater control over the policy outputs (Rudalivege 2002). Politicization, on
the other hand, is relatively low cost because of its constitutional and historical foundation, but it
cannot guarantee results because political appointees may face bureaucratic resistance like in the
OCR. Politicization can also hurt the performance of the agency because of the appointee’s lack
of experience and expertise. If politicization is an effective means by which the president can
control the bureaucracy, then the president can save political capital and resources by relying on
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it rather than further centralizing those roles. If not, those appointments will damage the agency
performance to produce only patronage opportunities for the president.
Yet, while there may be theoretical trade-offs between centralization and politicization,
scholars have neglected the intersection of these two methods of presidential control. This blind
spot blurs lines of political accountability and further enables the president to take over an
institutional policymaking space which is said to prize neutral expertise. It is impossible to
understand how President Trump or any president is able to impose their agenda upon a law or
an agency that may not align by only looking at a single mechanism of control. Better
understanding how presidents influence the federal rulemaking process allows observers to hold
the president accountable for rules and regulations they may not seem superficially responsible
for.
This thesis will investigate this relationship. Using data from the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) and OIRA, I quantitatively model the relationship between agency
politicization and policy outputs. To measure politicization, I work off of the seminal work of
Lewis (2008), extending its measures through 2015. The central innovation of this paper,
however, is the use of OIRA decision data as a measure of presidential control over the rules
making process, cutting across the dual literatures of centralization and politicization. While
OIRA is widely understood to be a presidential institution designed to modify regulations, it has
never been used before to test the effectiveness of politicization (West, 2005; Shapiro, 2005;
Wiseman, 2009; Yackee, 2019). Because OIRA review operates on the level of the individual
regulation, it allows me to study whether policy aligns with presidential preferences using a
single, generalizable variable and without having to make subjective judgements. Moreover,
using rules as the unit of analysis allows me to directly measure politicization’s effects on policy
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outputs instead of relying on proxy variables. This model’s ability to objectively measure
political control across the federal bureaucracy is a significant methodological advancement
beyond the case studies that previously dominated this field.
Ultimately, I find that agencies with higher levels of politicization promulgate rules that
are less likely to be substantively reviewed by OIRA, signaling the rule is in line with
presidential priorities. Additionally, I find no evidence that the further increasing the level of
political appointees has diminishing marginal returns for presidential control until the very
highest levels of politicization, suggesting that presidents are incentivized to politicize agencies
even when political appointees are hurting agency performance. These findings confirm that
political appointees meaningfully impact executive control over agencies’ policy outputs—
agencies are more likely to write rules that align with presidential preferences if there is a higher
concentration of political appointees in their top ranks. Second, it adds empirical evidence to the
claim that centralization and politicization act as substitutes. In sum, these findings bridge a
crucial gap in the literature on presidential control while tying together a wide set of studies on
the effectiveness of politicization with the first generalizable variable to measure congruence
between agency outputs and presidential preferences.
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Literature Review
Building the Arena
The common narrative of American government places the legislative process at the
center of policy formation, but obscures how administrative politics shape how public policy
touches the everyday lives of citizens. American history is often told as a one-way road of
institutional creation. One where social movements spark congressional action, creating some
new program or agency to address the problem at hand and subsequently handing the new
program off to the bureaucracy to be faithfully executed. This focus, however, limits the story of
American political development to a story about the abstract creation of institutions rather than
how Americans experience being governed (Carpenter 2001). One can only understand
American society’s relationship with the government by studying the actual administration of
policy.
The legislative process may set the parameters of possible public policy, but no statute
can to be applied as written and its text does not necessarily dictate how it is applied. Policy
formation does not cease with the last letter of the president’s signature, but rather continues
through an understudied secondary political arena: the rulemaking process. There political actors
compete to insert and protect their priorities in the rules and regulations that implement laws—a
process called administrative politics. And while expected actors like Congress and the president
garner much of the attention, the action of bureaucrats and the expanding role of the American
bureaucracy have shaped the political development of the American government as those
democratic branches have reacted to contain and control the decisive rulemaking process.
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Awakening a New Rival
The transition to a merit system for majority of the federal workforce and a new emphasis
on neutral competence created space for bureaucrats to establish their autonomy, creating the
new arena of administrative politics. Before the modern merit system, patronage dominated the
American bureaucracy. From the Jackson Administration until 1883, political parties used
positions within federal agencies as spoils to distribute to their supporters. All civil servants paid
a portion of their wages to political parties for fear of termination. Eventually, widespread
corruption, incompetence, and the assassination of President Garfield by a man who could not
secure a patronage position led to the Pendleton Reform Act of 1883, creating a new class of
protected federal employees who would be selected on their merit and protected from corrupting
political pressure (Lewis 2008). Before this reform, political parties held the federal bureaucracy
by their paychecks and so there was no need for complicated institutions of political control.
Without any serious protection for federal employees there was no real opportunity for
bureaucratic autonomy.
At the turn of the 20th Century, a push by Progressives for “neutral competence” in the
federal bureaucracy would eventually establish agencies and bureaucrats as semi-autonomous
political actors. This sentiment is most famously found in Woodrow Wilson’s (1887) call to
bifurcate the political system. On one side there would be politicians who established a collective
purpose and, on the other, an apolitical administrative state charged to carry out that purpose.
These new Progressive leaders like Theodore Roosevelt, Robert La Follete, and Woodrow
Wilson pushed to professionalize the federal bureaucracy in response to the lack of competence
and capacity that plagued our administrative state before the advent of the merit system. This
effort would create institutions that were able to leverage their expertise to build relationships
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with interests groups and political actors and carve out discretion over parts of policy (Carpenter
2000). Agencies would use that discretion to not just faithfully execute policy handed to them by
Congress, but also to innovate themselves and create programs that served previously unrealized
interests of those elected officials (Carpenter 2000). When they accomplished those goals and
politicians began to see it in their own interest to defer to the bureaucracy and agencies were able
to insulate their decisions from political pressure, agencies achieved bureaucratic autonomy.
Since those reforms, agencies have routinely acted strategically to preserve their
reputations and use their relationships with other political actors to preserve that discretion.
When the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) approves riskier drugs, it frequently consults its
advisory committees made up of outside experts to spread out the political risk to a broader
group of stakeholders and preserve the reputation in case of an unforeseen drug malfunction
(Moffitt 2010). These consultations not only protect the FDA’s reputation, but also strengthens
the network of people who are invested in preserving the autonomy of the FDA to preserve their
own influence in the process. This type of strategic action can also be found in the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) where high-level civil servants may decide what
industries to focus enforcement on, but mid-tier managers insist on neutral and consistent
application of agency standards to maintain the agency’s status as a fair arbiter of workplace
safety (Huber 2007; Witko 2013). While these are not cases of agencies writing regulations, the
instances form patterns of agencies acting politically to preserve their autonomy. Since the
Progressives entrenched neutral competence into the federal bureaucracy, the professionalization
and development of a long-term institutional cultures like those in the FDA and OSHA have
turned bureaucrats within them into a new set of political actors.
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Bureaucrats have leveraged these instances of innovation and autonomous action to drive
central parts of the development of the American welfare and regulatory state. For example, the
postal inspector at the turn of the 20th century, Anthony Comstock, leveraged the reputation of
the Postal Service to create anti-pornography and anti-lottery rules, promoting a particular set of
puritan values across the entire mail delivery service (Carpenter 2001). On a larger scale, the
early bureaucratic leaders of Social Security helped a limited statute become the preeminent
income protection program of the American government (Cates, 1983) These actions have not
abated recently, as the FDA, for example, took a strong stance on calorie labeling on menus in
2010 because it matched the public health priorities among the career civil servants in the FDA,
despite vocal opposition from industry groups and politicians and with only tepid support from
the White House (Potter, 2019). A vague mandate in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) combined
with insulation from political pressure gave FDA bureaucrats an opportunity to promote their
own priorities for public health and change the dining experience of the entire country. These
seem like minor aspects of American life, but those types of changes accumulate over time and
so has the impact of bureaucratic action. It has been over a century since Progressivism broke
politicians absolute control of bureaucracies and unelected bureaucrats have used this newfound
independence to guide existing programs and create new ones to match their own personal
values.
The Political Response
In response to bureaucratic action, elected officials have used the publics’ almost inherent
distrust of the bureaucracy to justify expanding their own power to control the bureaucracy. The
bureaucracy has long been a target of political ire, from both elected officials and regular citizens
on either side of the aisle (Kaufman 1981). The fear of an “out of control” administrative state in
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the 1930s and 40s—and to this day—allowed Congress and the President to rapidly expand their
own capacity in response to the threat of a new and growing undemocratic branch of government
(Rourke 1992). Consequently, the growth of a powerful presidency “is in no small measure a
product of a widely perceived need to prevent the emergence of an imperial bureaucracy”
(Rourke 1987). Bureaucratic autonomy has altered the dynamics and institutions of our
government not only through action, but also by acting as almost a political boogeyman. That
fear, however, is not illegitimate, federal agencies and bureaucrats acting as political actors does
create serious issues of accountability and a lack of democratic responsiveness, spurring
politicians to protect their ability to fulfill the wishes of their constituents.
The presidential and Congressional reaction to the expansion of bureaucratic autonomy
was not solely to protect democratic values, but also taking advantage of an opportunity to
expand their own reach and to gain an advantage over the other. A newly competent
bureaucracy, if tamed, offered a second chance to influence policy that had already been passed
and signed into law (Moe 1985). For, even in the age of patronage, the president did not
functionally control the bureaucracy, rather a coalition of local party bosses doled out patronage
jobs and demanded the loyalty of civil servants (Kaufman 1956). A responsive bureaucracy
offered a new chance to change the meanings of laws that had already escaped the breadth of
their traditional powers. If Congress or the president could effectively control bureaucratic
outcomes, they would gain a major weapon in the ongoing institutional battle against the other.
Beginning in earnest under the Franklin Roosevelt Administration, presidents leveraged a
distrust of an expanding bureaucracy to shift the locus of political power in the United States into
the newly institutionalized presidency (Rourke 1987; Milkis 2002; Krause and Cohen 2000).
But, along with this newfound capacity, came greater expectations to accomplish campaign
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promises and increase national prosperity than the president could feasibly achieve with what
underdeveloped mechanisms of control they had, let alone just their limited Constitutional
powers.
The Expectation Gap
FDR was the first modern president to tie control of the bureaucracy into the foundation
of his political philosophy. While FDR is not commonly thought of as an ideological president,
careful examination of his legislative and speaking record show a president who fundamentally
shifted the orientation of political power by using bureaucratic control as a central tool (Milkis
2002). Before he could make use of the bureaucracy, however, FDR had to justify its growth to
the American people. Among many other things, the New Deal’s guarantee of basic material
welfare to all citizens was an act of intergenerational political theory synthesis—squaring the
foundational American promise of personal freedom with an age of industrial capitalism and
economic inequality. FDR sought to secure individual liberty through that promise rather than
the arguably outdated system of property and contract rights designed by the Founders. New
Dealers used that logic to justify to a hostile American public the expansion of the national
bureaucracy and the centralization of its power into hands of the president (Milkis 2002). But to
capitalize on this new opportunity, FDR had to actually capture the bureaucracy and in doing so
he transform the American presidency.
The Executive Reorganization Act of 1939 created the Executive Office of the President
(EOP), established the White House Office (WHO), and transferred of the Bureau of the Budget
(BOB) into the new EOP and marks the consolidation of the administrative presidency (Berman
2015; Pffiner 1994; Wyszomirski 1991). While institutions like BOB were already understood to
be tools of the president before, the reorganization was not just administrative juggling, but a
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reimagination of the president’s role within the bureaucracy. This act was part of what Milkis
(2002) coined as Roosevelt’s “Third New Deal”, a plan to redesign institutions of government to
conform to his new brand of liberalism and to place the president at the head of the
administrative state. Before this expansion, previous presidents lacked sufficient resources to
exert control over the presidency—for example, in 1922, the president only had 31 relatively
low-level staffers at his disposal (Hart 1995, 23). The massive expansion of the administrative
power of the president in 1939 changed what was possible for the president to achieve and
resulted in a qualitative change in the culture and purpose of the presidency. And while it would
take the next several decades for the presidency we have today to emerge, that was the year it
was born.
Roosevelt’s transformation of the presidency extended beyond institution building as he
set such high standards of accomplishment and leadership that later presidents would have to
expand the presidency to live up his example (Lowi 1985). Roosevelts’ use of media and
rhetoric, development of legislative programs, use of independent powers, and the creation and
use of the presidential staff reshaped the publics expectations of the presidency and its
responsibilities (Dickinson 1996). FDR’s comprehensive first 100 Days agenda set a precedent
that has loomed over the every administration since, as presidents are almost required to rollout
an annual legislative agenda (Simon 2010; Miroff 2006). Roosevelt’s administration was
transformative not simply because of his choice to take on the legislative initiative, but also
because rather than attempting to claw that role back, Congress and other political elites
institutionalized it in the Employment Act of 1946 and the National Security Act of 1947
(Sundquist 1981, 61-126).
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After Roosevelt seized the role of initiator for the presidency, the public began to expect
the president to produce results. The American public assumed that the president would be able
to provide economic prosperity, peace and security, and domestic policy initiatives— to satisfy
public expectations, the president now had to deliver on specific policy demands (Seligman and
Baer 1969). Leading the debate over policy was no longer enough, the president also had to be
able to secure their agenda’s enactment and implementation (Ostrom and Simon, 1985; and
Edwards 1983). Failure to meet those expectations painted the administration as a failure
regardless of whether the president had the legal or constitutional authority, or enough political
capital to succeed (Lowi 1985; Raichur and Waterman 1993; Waterman et. al 1999). The
American people began to think that the President could accomplish anything (Neustandt 1980
[1960]).
The Constitution, however, created a weak presidency, one that could not live up to the
expectations of the mid-20th century. Early presidents were arbiters, not initiators; when people
looked for national leadership, they first turned to Congress (Waterman et al. 2014). Elites and
the public agreed upon the limited role of the presidency in directing public affairs and weak
presidents outnumbered the strong in the 19th century. In line with their secondary role in the
political system, presidential staffs did not even reach double digits until the 20th century and
even then the staff was more clerical than policy focused (Moe 1985; Rudalevige 2002). Early
presidents lacked the political capital and the institutional capacity, outside of the Lincoln
administration, to put together comprehensive personal policy platforms, let alone ensure their
implementation. And while the institution of the presidency Roosevelt created was able to
accomplish far more than any previous president, presidents initially still struggled to control the
bureaucracy (Moe 1985; Nathan, 1983). Presidents have all strained to push their policy
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proposals through the federal bureaucracy, a frustration verbalized when Kennedy famously said
to a caller, “I agree with you, but I don’t know if the government will” (Nathan, 1983). The
question of how to satisfy these grand expectations without significant constitutional power has
driven presidents to look towards the bureaucracy as a way to close the gap.
With high expectations and little sympathy for their lack of constitutional power, the
President’s electoral future and historical legacy depended on their ability to satisfy broad
national interests and deliver goods to their own coalition (Moe 1985, Neustandt 1980 [1960]).
Given that they could not control the legislative process, the president only had one feasible way
to satisfy those demands: to seek control over the bureaucracy. The president became the only
elected official who was directly invested in how the bureaucracy as a whole was organized and
whether she had the capacity to manage it effectively (Moe 1989). Subsequent presidents had
varying approaches to govern the administrative state, but all would use their ability to appoint
managers to federal agencies, a process known as politicization, and each tried to draw authority
into the institutions within the fledgling EOP such as OMB, the White House Staff, or eventually
OIRA, a strategy known as centralization.
This gap between the expectations of the president and his capacity spurred a new
generation of advocates of neutral competence, but ones who recognized the presidential need to
control the bureaucracy. The advocates did not call for bureaucrats to work towards a utilitarian
public interest, rather that they advise and cooperate fully with the partisan appointees who
directed agencies (Heclo, 1975). In this idealized world of neutral competence, the bureaucracy
would faithfully fulfill the demands of the political branches of government and there would be
no need for mechanisms of control. This rebranding balanced neutral competence with
democratic responsiveness and framed the fundamental tradeoffs in administrative politics.
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The new theory understood that allowing politics to subsume administration would
destroy the expertise and legitimacy of our bureaucracy, but divorcing public administration
from democratic institutions to improve its technocratic competence came at the cost of its
responsiveness and thus its legitimacy. This rebranding of neutral competence understood that
newfound bureaucratic autonomy was a direct challenge to our democratic values (Kaufman
1956). It maintained that political appointees and careerists have distinct roles in the
implementation of policy, but acknowledged this tension between competence and
responsiveness. While Heclo’s (1975) theory never came to be because of bureaucratic resistance
and competition with Congress, it has shaped the development of the institutional presidency for
the past forty years.
The President’s Toolbox
The framework created in 1939 has come to be known as the institutional presidency and
now includes advisory committees like the Council of Economic Advisors as well as the network
of political appointees that the president places in federal agencies (Moe 1985; Burke 2000). In
the following decades, presidents would invest in the EOP—expanding its capacity, adaptability
and complexity. Some of these investments have taken the form of new administrative units
within the EOP—from five in in 1939 to 15 in 1992—many of which survive through multiple
administrations (Ragsdale and Thies 1997). Expansion also took the form of a greater capacity to
identify, vet, and place loyal and qualified appointees to federal agencies (Lewis 2011; Kumar
2009). With these new capabilities, the institutional presidency would take on new slates of
comprehensive policy responsibilities like civil rights, crime, and healthcare in the 60s and the
War on Drugs in the 70s (Ragsdale and Theis 1997). This infrastructure of control was used to

23

bypass and compensate for the institutional weaknesses of the presidency and took the form two
primary tools of control: centralization and politicization.
The Wrench
Politicization is the oldest tool of bureaucratic control available to the president, but the
role played by political appointees over the past forty years would be unrecognizable to the
Founding Fathers or even Woodrow Wilson. Today, political appointees stretch not just across,
but also deep into the federal bureaucracy, occupying positions ranging from the Secretary of
Education to an Advisor for Strategic Partnerships and Diversity Engagement. Political
appointees are a tempting mechanism for presidents seeking to control the federal bureaucracy
because they are relatively easy to appoint and offer the chance to insert the president’s authority
directly into a potentially hostile federal agency. Since the Eisenhower Administration,
presidents have formalized and institutionalized the appointment process to try to fully take
advantage of the potential of politicization.
During this time, appointments have shifted from a tool of national political parties, used
to distribute patronage to supporters, to a crucial mechanism for the president, one that exerts
influence over much of the policy produced by the bureaucracy (Weko 1995). As presidents
became increasingly independent from their political parties, they began to use politicization to
build their own political apparatuses, ones that could potentially meet the rising expectations of
the president as the generalized leader of the country, but ones resting upon the uncertain
effectiveness of political appointees.
While Eisenhower was the first to formalize the appointment process, a presidentcentered appointments process truly began with the Kennedy and Johnson administration. Using
centralized capacity in the White House Office, Kennedy and Johnson coordinated and organized
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the recruitment and placement of appointees. Neither president, however, focused on
appointments as an explicit means of political control. Johnson certainly demanded loyalty from
his appointees, but both presidents prioritized expertise, experience and other qualities of
competence. This development came as political parties lost control of presidential primaries and
thus their claim to the patronage spoils of winning the White House allowing Kennedy and
Johnson to select their own appointees.
Nixon, however, moved to make political appointments a key feature of presidential
control, a radical break from the focus on professionalization under previous administrations.
Facing an unfriendly Democratic Congress, the bureaucracy was Nixon’s primary avenue to
influence policy. Since he was unable to create new agencies like Johnson, Nixon was left with
politicization. Using the centralized institutions within the EOP created by Kennedy and Johnson
like the Office for Management and Budget (OMB) and the Presidential Personnel Office (PPO),
Nixon and his advisors George Shultz and John Ehrlichman moved loyal and ideologically
committed appointees into key positions throughout the bureaucracy (Nathan 1983). Eventually,
the rest of the political system rejected Nixon’s ambitious attempt to assert control as an
illegitimate action of an imperial president, but process of politicization had already begun in
earnest.
The Watergate scandal placed Congress and the American public on high alert against the
encroaching power of the president and so Ford and Carter did not explicitly use politicization as
a means of political control. But, the White House and EOP still continued to work as a
centralized and politicized high-capacity hub for presidential leadership in the bureaucracy,
placing appointees in positions of power and formulating policy.
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After a rejection of the weak Carter presidency in the 1980 election, Reagan came in
with a mandate for decisive presidential action (Moe 1985). Reagan believed that the
bureaucracy had a structural liberal bias and that bureaucrats were liberal actors who would try
to undermine his conservative agenda. He set about using tasks forces to better understand
federal agencies so he could efficiently allocate resources to control them. Reagan’s transition
team spent months interviewing potential appointees and their primary, if not sole requirement,
was that they were ideologically committed and deeply loyal to Reagan (Lewis 2008). They did
not seek to fill just the top positions, but worked to penetrate loyalists deep into the bureaucracy.
Not only did they fill vacant positions, Reagan removed career civil servants from posts and
replaced them with appointees as well as eliminated entire bureaucratic units filled by civil
servants. The transition team even ran orientations for all of the appointees themselves to prevent
them from assimilating into the culture of their new workplaces. The Reagan presidency set a
new precedent for the use of politicization and every subsequent president has followed his
example.
Today, all presidents use formal institutions to select loyal candidates from among the
thousands who apply and distribute them strategically throughout the bureaucracy to try and
control policy. Truman was the first president to have a specific aid to select appointments,
Kennedy had three in his administration, Nixon had just under 30, and today there are more than
a 100 during the transition period (Lewis 2011). This process begins before the administration
even takes office as Reagan’s perhaps ironically named personnel recruiter, Pendleton James,
said “Presidential personnel cannot wait for the election because the presidential personnel has to
be functional on the first day, the first minute of the first hour” (Kumar et. al. 2000, 3). Usually
working from within the PPO, staffers can sort through thousands of job applications to fill
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important policy positions and respond to patronage requests (Patterson and Pfiffner 2001).
Since the Reagan administration, the PPO, run by a close aide to the president, has been
responsible for choosing all presidential appointments, even lower level appointments that had
been traditionally reserved for Cabinet Secretaries (Patterson and Pfiffner 2001). As a result, the
president has almost total control over the almost 7,000 political appointees available to the
president (Lewis 2008).
Politicization is often discussed as a conservative tool to constrain a liberal bureaucracy,
especially because of Reagan’s prominent role in the history of politicization. This narrative has
two major flaws: Republican depoliticization and an apolitical need for control. First, Republican
presidents such as George H.W. Bush have also been responsible for efforts to depoliticize the
bureaucracy (Lewis 2008). Second, presidents of both parties struggle to control the bureaucracy
even with its liberal lean. While Republican presidents can face considerable resistance from a
bureaucracy that was mostly built by Democratic presidents who institutionalized their own
preferences into the missions and procedures of those agencies, liberal presidents also struggle to
control agencies who seek to go beyond what the president sees as politically feasible. President
Obama, for example, struggled to control the EPA throughout his administration because they
pursued more progressive climate change policy than he thought prudent at that moment (Haeder
and Yackee 2018). This means that though the bureaucracy, on average, may ideologically
advantage Democratic presidents, politicization is a bipartisan strategy for presidents surrounded
by an unfriendly bureaucracy.
Some may logically assume that presidents will increasingly use this general strategy to
gain continuously better control over the bureaucracy; however, presidents have not and cannot
increase politicization on a political whim. In fact, the president does not have the authority to
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create many types of appointed positions without congressional approval. While presidents can
allocate certain types of appointments to high-priority agencies, powerful positions like Assistant
Secretaries are specific to each agency (Lewis 2008). Moreover, empirical research has
demonstrated that the number of appointees is not always increasing, in fact, it even declined
between 1984-92 and has largely stayed steady since peaking under Carter (Paul Light 1999).
As a result, politicization should be thought of as a constrained resource of control for the
president, who must use positions strategically to advance their agenda.
In sum, presidents of both parties over the past six decades have radically reshaped the
role of political appointees and the selection process to create a tool that can be placed atop an
agency and used to twist the direction of an agency towards the president’s priorities.
Politicization, however, is not a perfect means of control so presidents have often turned to other
methods of political such as centralization.

The Hammer
When presidents are not able to achieve their goals, they often seek to centralize certain
functions of the broader executive branch into their staff within the Executive Office of the
President (EOP) and the White House Office (WHO). Centralization removes authority from
federal agencies over policy design, implementation, and oversight and places it within the EOP
or WHO. This growing presidential staff would come to form a “counterbureaucracy” that the
president could rely on for loyalty and responsiveness to the president’s priorities (Nathan 1983,
34; Moe 1985). Presidents used this “counterbureaucracy” to seize the policy initiative from
career civil servants in federal agencies. Rather than waiting to approve or edit proposals from
cabinet departments, presidents, especially after the Kennedy and Johnson administrations,
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formed task forces within the EOP to design their signature policy proposals, effectively cutting
bureaucrats out of the process (Rudalevige 2002; Pressman and Wildavsky 1984). Centralization,
however, extends far beyond drafting new legislation.
In the context of this paper, the most important form of centralization is the
institutionalization of regulatory review in OIRA. It is also the largest advance in presidential
power over the bureaucracy in decades because it allows the president, through a unit in the
EOP, to review and edit individual federal regulations to ensure that they are in line with his
agenda—a process called regulatory review (West 2005). While it began as a partisan tool of
conservative presidents, regulatory review soon became a foundational element of the
institutional presidency.
Republican presidents, trapped in what they saw as a liberal bureaucracy, were tired of
agencies promulgating rules and regulations that were antithetical to their beliefs. So after
piecemeal efforts to institute regulatory review during the Nixon and Ford administrations,
Reagan institutionalized regulatory review by granting authority to a young and permanent
institution: OIRA. Under Executive Order 12291, all agencies had to submit Final Rules and
notices of proposed rulemaking (NPRMs) to OIRA for review before any publication (Yackee
2019). This was a revolutionary presidential weapon in the battle with Congress over the
bureaucracy—one that allowed the president to monitor and hammer their preferences into
individual regulations (West and Cooper 1988). By the letter of the law, OIRA ran cost-benefit
analysis and OMB only allowed agencies to publish rules that were in the green. But, in reality,
OIRA review served to ensure that rules were in line with presidential priorities. While OIRA
lacked the official authority to change or reject rules, its proximity to the president made
agencies heed its decisions (West 2005).
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Congress put together a token resistance to this power grab by the president, but
ultimately failed to reverse it. Critics framed OIRA as a black box in which wealthy businesses
could influence rules away from public view (Eads and Fix 1984; Tolchin and Tolchin 1984).
Environmental groups protested vehemently against a new institution that threatened decades of
successful statutory and regulatory lobbying. Good governance advocates argued that regulatory
review allowed agencies to bypass the procedural rules and norms that demanded public
evidence and arguments to justify rules. In response, Congress threatened to defund OIRA and
allowed its authorization to lapse, but OIRA was continuously funded and soon reauthorized
under the condition that its administrator would be confirmed by the Senate and its deliberation
made more transparent (West 2004). With these minor concessions in hand, Reagan and
subsequent presidents have continued to use regulatory review to influence policy despite
attempts by Congress and interests groups to undermine the process (Moe and Lewis, 2018).
President Clinton repealed executive order 12291 in 1993, but immediately replaced it
with EO 12866, which created a similar scheme, but one that was more favorable to his proregulation stances and required agencies to submit any rule that was deemed “economically
significant” for review (Croley 2003). A rule was considered economically significant if it met
any of stated standards: it would have a sizable impact on the economy (more than $100 million
per year); create any contradictions or inconsistencies with the current law or regulation; or ran
counter to the president’s regulatory mission (Wiseman, 2009). Under the new regime, the
president could choose to review essentially any rule from any agency. Agencies continued to
submit rules to OIRA for review twice before a rule took effect, once before the notice of
proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register and then again after the agency adopts a final rule.
By the Clinton Administration, OIRA was fully entrenched in the rule making process. The year
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after regulatory review power was vested in OIRA, only 10% of rules published in the Federal
Register were changed after OIRA review, by 2001 almost 70% were changed or entirely
withdrawn by the agency (Wiseman, 2009). OIRA review, moreover, was not only suggesting
changes within the bounds of Congressional discretion, but also those that lead to rules that
deviate from Congressional intent (O’Connor, 1988; Heizerling, 2006). OIRA review quickly
became ubiquitous for new federal regulations and that ability to not just make small changes to
policy, but move it in whole new directions greatly expanded presidential power.
Crucially, OIRA, as with most centralized agencies, does not have an institutional culture
hostile to the president like many independent federal agencies. OIRA can be understood as a
tool of the president, as an extension of his priorities, because of the institutional structure and a
few decades of evidence. Just like other centralized organizations mentioned above, OIRA’s
proximity to the president and its placement within OMB keeps it responsive to the president
(Rudalevige 2002; Yackee 2019; Wiseman 2009, West 2005). And while there is a relatively
strong and stable culture within OIRA that is skeptical of government regulation and in favor of
rigorous analysis of regulation, the institution depends upon the president for its political
authority (West, 2005; Rudalevige 2009). Dependency breeds loyalty and so OIRA still follows
the directives and agenda of liberal presidents. Careerists within OIRA during the Clinton
Administration, while initially reticent, accepted the new administrators vision for the
organization and actively worked to help enable the new agenda (West, 2005; Yackee 2019).
Even if this were not true, the structure of OIRA lends almost complete control over the agency
to the president.
The administrator of OIRA, a political appointee and a close ally of the president, is a
choke point in the organization, ensuring all decisions are in line with the president’s agenda.
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The administrator must approve any decision to return rules to an agency and she, or her deputy,
also serve as the negotiator with agencies over any changes (West, 2005). This means that there
is always a presidential eye on the regulatory gatekeeper. Presidential priorities are pervasive in
OIRA and trickle down through formal directives, informal communications, and tacit
understandings to influence the day-to-day decisions of careerists (West, 2005; Bolton et. al.
2014). The careerists are also politically minded and understand that their future depends upon
their compliance and good politics beats out objective analysis if they happen to be in conflict in
a review (Shapiro, 2004). The presidential agenda has become the culture of OIRA and
bureaucratic resistance is negligible.
The president has developed two broad and strong methods to control administrative
outcomes, politicization and centralization give him theoretical control over much of the rule
making in federal agencies. Especially put together, they seem to give the president an
unbreakable advantage in the arena of administrative politics. Yet, presidents still face
considerable resistance in bureaucratic policy making from political actors who have the
institutional power to at least challenge presidential domination.

Impediments to Presidential Control
While the Constitution vests “executive power” in the presidency, the president faces two
actors who can potentially block his agenda. The first is the bureaucracy itself. We have already
established that bureaucrats and agencies have acted as political actors since the beginning of the
20th century. Their independence creates a principal-agent problem for the president as he tries to
control career bureaucrats actions. This problem is further complicated by a Congress which
often does not share the same incentives as the president, but also has constitutional authority
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over the bureaucracy and the president’s tools to control it. Presidents must operate within this
existing set of impediments because they lack the political capital or time to overhaul these
institutions to create a responsive system (Moe 1985).
The Principal-Agent Problem and Home Field Advantage
The Classic Problem
To better understand elected officials struggle to control a semi-autonomous bureaucracy,
political scientists borrowed the concept of a principal-agent problem from economists. The
classic economics version of the problem is used to explain how an employer (principal) can
navigate having an employee (agent) with different preferences (a conflict of interests). The
principal must give the agent some amount of discretion because she is unable to write a contract
that could cover how the agent should act in every scenario, but the agent could then use this
discretion to pursue their own preferences rather than the principals’. The problem is created
when discretion must be granted despite the conflict of interest and asymmetric information
between the two parties consisting of an adverse selection problem—i.e. the principals inability
to know their subordinates true preferences or abilities–and moral hazard—the impossibility of
monitoring the agent’s behavior at all times (Brehm and Gates, 1997). As a result, the principal
and agent struggle to work together efficiently, which can create agency costs that prevent
optimal outcomes.
In our case, the president (principal) must give the bureaucrats (agents) some level of
discretion because career civil servants occupy positions of power and have the necessary
subject-area expertise to write new rules that could advance the president’s agenda. Because civil
servants rise through a merit system and are not appointed by the president, the president cannot
know their particular preferences (the adverse selection problem), nor can the president always
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know how the bureaucrat may be pursuing those preferences throughout the rulemaking process
(the moral hazard). The informational asymmetry and potential conflict of interest makes it
difficult for the president to choose the right mixture of responsiveness and competence,
producing suboptimal outcomes. For example, the president may over-politicize an agency to
ensure compliance, stripping away the necessary expertise to write coherent regulations. In this
situation, the president may also simply choose not to delegate authority to an agency because he
does not trust the resulting policy will be in his interest, eliminating the existence of a possibly
beneficial rule. These conditions of uncertainty undermine the president’s ability to get the
policy he wants from the bureaucracy and for the bureaucracy to produce needed rules. The
principal-agent problem only made worse for the president—and thus even less efficient for
all—by the numerous ways bureaucrats have discovered to influence policy and protect their
own interests over those of the president.
Decades of institutional knowledge, subject-area expertise, and agency insulation provide
bureaucrats within agencies the means and the opportunity to advance their own interests and
subvert those of political overseers. In the almost seventy-five years since the APA was passed,
career civil servants have had the chance to learn the nuances of each procedure and discover
loopholes to exploit. This allows bureaucrats the opportunity to take advantage of favorable
political conditions to increase the volume of their rulemaking and advance their own
institutional interests (Boushey and McGrath 2015). Most iterations of the principal-agent model
focus only on the informational asymmetry in the context of the values of bureaucrats or up-todate information on agency actions, but ignore that bureaucrats are also the ones to implement
the procedures meant to control them and can leverage that procedural knowledge to protect their
autonomy.
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When Reality is Worse Than Theory
To describe this phenomena, Potter (2019) coined the term “procedural politicking”
which she defines as “using procedures in strategic ways so as to insulate policies that are at risk
of political interventions and ensure that bureaucrat-preferred policies endure” (6). Bureaucrats
use three primary tools to do so: authorship, the participation valve, and the timing (Potter,
2019). Each of these tools take advantage of career civil servants’ superior institutional
knowledge as well as position as the first mover, whose actions the political actors must react to.
First, how a regulation is written influences how it is received by other political actors;
the proper framing of a new rule can make an unpopular policy proposal sound reasonable. For
example, filling a proposed rule with scientific citations may give a half-baked rule credibility.
Technical framing of problems and jargon is especially useful to prevent political principals from
engaging deeply with the actual policy outcomes the rules promote. If an appointee, member of
Congress, or judge, all of whom lack the expertise of a career civil servant, is uncertain about the
policy outcomes of a proposed rule, they are less able to effectively alter the rule and ensure that
it is in line with their priorities.
Second, bureaucrats can also vary how they seek external input on their proposed rules,
both from the public and interest groups as well as political principals. APA guidelines are
vague, so agencies have many opportunities to shape how they choose to allow a rule to be
engaged with, be it the length and/or timing of a comment period, whether they announce their
plan to publish a rule, or even create a committee of stakeholders who can negotiate the content
of the rule (Potter 2019). Finally, bureaucrats can decide when to expose the rule to criticism and
political influence. By doing so, bureaucrats can choose the political environment into which
their rule is born into and increase its likelihood of survival.

35

In sum, when the president tries to move policy through federal agencies, he faces a set of
political actors who have far more specific knowledge and can leverage their position to protect
their own interests in new regulations. Those obstacles are compounded by the informational
asymmetry that prevents the president from knowing bureaucrat’s preferences and how they
pursue those preferences through procedural politicking.
In our case, presidential power is further challenged by congressional claims to authority
over the bureaucracy, creating a multiple principals-agent problem. Competition between the
multiple principals exacerbates the problems associated with principal-agent relationships. First,
as the president and Congress fight to have their priorities written into new rules, agencies are
able to use that rivalry to paralyze oversight and monitoring mechanisms (Krause 1999). Second,
divided authority begets divided responsibility so that neither the president, nor Congress feel
fully responsible for the policy outcomes produced by the agency and thus are less willing to
bear the high costs of oversight and monitoring (Krause, 1999). Third, if the principals reach a
compromise, the agent will still advocate for their own likely diverging interest, undermining the
incentive for the principals to compromise (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 1987). In sum, the
addition of extra-principals makes it increasingly unlikely that the principal and agent will find a
stable outcome.
Congress and the President face a pressing dilemma: they must be able to control
bureaucratic policy outcomes to be able to provide the benefits necessary to be reelected, yet
they face considerable resistance from bureaucrats and agency structures. Each institution have
harnessed their Constitutional authority to develop tools to preserve their preferences in the
bureaucratic process. The struggle for control over the bureaucracy, however, does not pit the
administrators against the coordinated and cooperative power of Congress and the presidency;
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there is enormous conflict between the executive and legislative branches over control of the
bureaucracy. Bureaucratic control is a valuable political resource that each seeks to use to
advance their own interests and secure their reelection or historical legacy. Power, by definition,
is zero-sum. The greater control one branch has over the bureaucracy reduces the others’,
incentivizing each principal to undermine the influence of the other in pursuit of their own
control. As a result, each branch has tried to outmuscle the other, using oversight mechanisms to
try to ensure their own priorities are represented in rules and regulations. If Congress is
successfully able to solve the principal-agent problem, it significantly reduces the president’s
ability to control the bureaucracy.
The Cross Town Rivals
To solve the principal-agent problem, Congress has increased its ability to monitor
agency behavior through the expansion of oversight committees, subject-area specific
committees, and constituency services. These committees provide policy expertise to Congress
and allow Congress to keep an eye on bureaucratic activity, hypothetically reducing the
informational asymmetry between the principal and agent (McCubbins et al. 1987; Aberbach
1990). However, constituency services may be the best detection system members of Congress
have to identify agencies drifting from the interests of a Congressperson; angry constituents will
make themselves known quickly when their interests are threatened (McCubbins and Shwartz
1984; Weingast 1984). Ultimately, the cost—both in terms of time and resources that could be
used to provide benefits to constituents— of monitoring agency behavior outweigh the benefits
of the imperfect success rate (McCubbins et al. 1987). Given the limits of Congressional
monitoring, Congress must be able to sanction bureaucrats and agencies to have any real control
over their actions.
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Congress has a wide array of potential sanctions to choose from, but their high political
cost limit their actual use. In theory, Congress can remove civil servants from office, impeach
political appointees, cut funding to rebellious programs, launch investigations, and reorganize
agencies to reallocate political authority to cooperative agencies. But in reality, criminal charges
can only be brought against civil servants who willfully violated the letter of the law; passing
new legislation requires a high level of cooperation and threatens the legislative status quo; and
investigations or cutting funding can both reduce service delivery to members of Congress’
constituents as well as draw attention to the members inability to control an agency (Moe 1987;
McCubbins et al. 1987). As result, sanctioning the bureaucracy can be more costly for Congress
than allowing them promulgate unfriendly regulations because of the divided responsibility with
the president.
Even with these tools available, Congress’ collective action problem cripples its ability to
control the bureaucracy, especially when faced with a unilateral actor like the president. While
Congress is often described as a unitary actor by scholars of bureaucratic administration, the 535
members that make up Congress are constitutionally autonomous actors, each with their own
constituencies, electoral timelines, and incentive (Moe and Lewis, 2018). Few members of
Congress will turn down a new infrastructure project or saving a military base in their district to
preserve the balance of power between branches. Their first priority is to satisfy the demands of
their constituents or relevant interests groups, not to present a unified front against presidential
encroachment.
Some might argue that party leadership provides the strong, unifying force required to
protect Congressional power, but partisan incentives undercut that aligning of interests. Party
leaders do have vested interests in sustaining the power of Congress as an institution and could
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use tools like committee positions and campaign funding to corral members to unify against the
president. And while electoral incentives push members of Congress outside of the presidents’
party to limit the presidents’ power, their colleagues across the aisle have the same incentives to
empower the president (Moe and Lewis 2018, Kernell 1977). These diverging incentives in
Congress undo a theoretical consensus on not just the degree to which they should protect their
role in controlling the bureaucracy, but also whether they should protect it at all.
Dissonant incentives among members raises the costs of congressional action, which
makes the institutions vulnerable to presidential encroachment. Legislation needs massive
coalitions to make it through the many veto points it passes through when it travels through the
relevant subcommittee, committee, and floor vote in each chamber and then finally through the
reconciliation process. These coalitions must satisfy the demands of hundreds of political
entrepreneurs with different constituencies, vulnerabilities, and priorities—commitments to one
can just as quickly endanger the support of others (Moe and Howell, 1999). Such a fractious
body engaged in a process with so many opportunity to sabotage stands little chance against a
unitary actor like the president.
In this contest for control, the common narrative paints Congress as the president’s
primary rival to control bureaucratic outcomes, but Congress’ structural disadvantages cripple its
ability to compete with the president and bureaucrats themselves. Despite the extensive ex ante
controls and ex post sanctions, Congress’ collection action problem, partisan divides, and the
high costs of sanctions greatly reduce its ability to actual guide bureaucratic policy outcomes. In
the end, Congress’ best tools to influence agency behavior are not modern innovations, but
powers granted by the Constitution: drafting the legislation that bureaucrats must apply and its
role in the appointment process.
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The Hammer or the Wrench
Just like Congressional sanctions, centralization and politicization are powerful tools of
bureaucratic control that are limited by their inherent costs. Each provide the president
opportunities to advance his own agenda over the objection of federal agencies, but does so by
handing responsibility to more loyal, but less competent staffers. This tradeoff between expertise
and loyalty forms a framework through which to study presidential control. A rational president
will choose the route that offers the greatest amount of congruence between his agenda and a
policy, at the lowest cost to the quality of the policy. This tradeoff underlies the strengths and
weaknesses of centralization and politicizations discussed below.
Hitting the Screw on the Head
Loyalty is not an issue in centralized institutions because proximity to and political
dependence on the president have deeply imbedded the president’s priorities into the EOP and
WHO and negate the principal-agent problem. Aides and staffers within the EOP and WHO
depend upon the president for not just their position, but also their political relevancy
(Rudalevige 2002). They are unlike political appointees who also serves at the pleasure of the
president, but whose position within a federal agency lends them some authority independent of
how the president directs them. In contrast, centralized institutions are designed to ensure that
those within are only relevant if the president delegates a task or chooses to approve their
proposal (Wyszomirski 1982). Along with a structural dependence on the president, these aides
and staffers often share a literal structure with president, a physical intimacy that breeds loyalty
and trust (Rudalevige 2002). In the EOP or WHO, the president faces no risk of an appointee
assimilating into a hostile agency. Over the past fifty plus years, presidents have guaranteed
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compliance from centralized institutions by cutting them off from any source political legitimacy
or authority besides that of the president.
Along with loyalty, the political timeline of White House aides align better with the
president’s short-term focus than bureaucrats’. Presidents essentially only have the first year of
their term to craft policy before the midterm elections and then the next presidential campaign. If
presidents want to leave a tangible policy legacy, they need to act quickly and the time it takes to
formulate a policy proposal will limit any action they wish to take. In contrast, without any
electoral pressure, bureaucrats have long-term interests in effective policy, whether it comes
under the current administration or the next (Potter 2019). Compare this political insulation to
staffers within centralized agencies who often lose their jobs if the president loses an election.
Centralized proposals, consequently, do not have to wait for a political appointee to corral
cautious career civil servants, nor take the time to move through agencies’ formal rule writing
procedure. Within the EOP and WHO, aides’ loyalty and shared interests with the president have
incentivized presidents to invest in the EOP and expand its capacity without fear of empowering
rivals.
Given the clear benefits of centralization, it makes sense that traditional narrative
surrounding it is of an inexorable march towards greater and greater levels of centralization. The
EOP’s size and policy crafting capacity have expanded rapidly since 1939 and it now has an
expanded ability to direct policy design. For example, President Clinton’s attempted signature
overhaul of the healthcare system was entirely formulated within the White House. A Clinton
aide, Ira Magaziner, controlled the President’s Task Force on Health Care Reform with an iron
fist, not even allowing departments to run technical analysis of the plan. In comparison, when
President Eisenhower wanted to expand Social Security, his proposal was born and designed in
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the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) and was approved by the entire
Cabinet before it was eventually put to Congress and passed. In each case, presidential leadership
was central to the new policy, but different actors devised and attempted to implement the
policies. And while this is only a single example, it is one of many instances of how the president
has increased their role in the actual formulation of policy through centralized institutions.
Surely, this can only come from an ever increasing centralized capacity for policy design.
Centralization, however, is a high-cost tool of presidential control, one that consumes
political capital, can produce inferior policy, and risks the stability of the EOP and the WHO
(Rudalevige 2002). Because centralization is both high-cost and high-reward, the president must
decide for any given policy whether it is more efficient for him to produce the policy (centralize)
or buy it (use agencies). Centralization offers control and expediency, but the policy is made by
staffers without the expertise or experience of career civil servants within federal agencies and so
centralization may not be appropriate for complex policy issues. Additionally, these policies lack
the legitimacy that the traditional rulemaking process provides because they are seen as
impositions of presidential opinion. As a result, policies produced through centralization are
more likely to be rejected by Congress than those produced within federal agencies (Rudalevige
2002). Finally, presidential micro-management via centralization can destabilize the institutional
culture of the very offices entrusted to carry it out (Lamb and Twombly 2001). Given these
drawbacks, presidents will only centralize when the benefits outweigh these sometimes
considerable costs. Centralization is an imperfect method of political control and its weaknesses
and high-costs force the president to also rely on politicization to better control the federal
bureaucracy.

42

The Wrench:
Today, presidents have more than double the political appointees that were available to
Roosevelt in 1939 (Lewis 2011). The positions have shifted from regional related appointments
like those in Post Offices to policy making positions in Washington DC as presidents have tried
to capture key management positions and control policy “choke” points in federal agencies such
as budget offices, and offices of the general counsel (Weko 1995; Heclo 1977). Presidents have
come to understand, however, that these increases are only useful if they can control the
appointees who fill them. As a result, presidents have invested in institutions that have
formalized the selection process to ensure loyal candidates are chosen (Kumar 2009; Moe 1985;
Edwards 2001). Even with these formal systems and perhaps in-part because of them, the
president still lacks total control over their political appointees. First, Congressional approval for
high-level (and thus high-value) appointees means that the president likely cannot appoint their
ideal candidate and must compromise with Senate leadership (Warren 2012; Bertelli and Grose
2009, Snyder and Weingast 2000). Second, as appointees assimilate into the culture of agencies,
their loyalties to president may fade. Finally, presidents do not have an unlimited supply of
willing and loyal followers with the necessary experience to take on policymaking positions,
which pushes people less suited for management into the federal government. This lack of
competency among appointees can undermine their ability to control the bureaucracy and
execute the agenda of the president.
As the president’s institutional rival for control over the bureaucracy, the Senate can use
their considerable authority over the highest level of political appointees to prevent the president
from appointing her favorite candidate. Appointees to Senate confirmed positions must first pass
through committee hearing and floor votes where parliamentary procedures such as the use of
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executive sessions allow a single Senator to considerably delay or even kill a nomination if the
delay occurs close to the end of a session of Congress (McCarty and Razaghian 1999). The
Senate does not often use this power— only 7 percent of nominations fail even in Senates
controlled by the opposition (McCarty and Razaghian 1999). However, many scholars point to
this absence of action as evidence of presidents anticipating the preferences and potential
resistance of the Senate majority and tailoring their nominations to avoid conflict (Snyder and
Weingast 1994, Chang 2001, Moraski and Shipan 1999). It is difficult to empirically study this
kind of second-level strategy and so many of those studies use spatial models to analyze political
appointees on independent regulatory commissions, the Supreme Court and the Federal
Reserve—agencies that are not representative of much of the federal bureaucracy. Appointees
within these agencies influence policy by voting and so only influence policy outcomes if they
move the position of the median voter on whichever body they serve. In comparison, political
appointees to the wider bureaucracy influence policy by corralling career civil servants and make
use of the resources of an agency to produce regulation that supports the presidential agenda.
While those studies may not represent definitive proof of the Senate’s influence over
presidential appointees, patterns in “holds” provides empirical evidence that the Senate is more
than just a rubber stamp. As interbranch competition over the bureaucracy has increased,
senators have increasingly used procedural levers to delay the presidents nominees by placing
“holds” (Oleszek 2008). The pattern of “holds” suggest that the Senate is acting to protect its
own control over the bureaucracy. It extends the nomination processes for appointees to agencies
that are already highly politicized or are supervised by high-conflict congressional committees
while expediting the wait for nominations to less politicized or more insulated agencies, where
the president will have or desires less control (Dull, Roberts, and Keeney 2012).
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Generally, a president’s ability to quickly secure Senate confirmation for a nominee
depends upon how much political capital they have. For example, nominations are confirmed
quickly if they come early in a president’s first term or from a popular president (Dull, Roberts,
and Keeney 2012). The Senate’s responsiveness to the relative political power of a president in
combination with the pattern of holds show that the Senate acts strategically to protect its
interests. Those patterns support theories like those in Warren (2012) and Snyder and Weingast
(2000) that argue that the president preempts Senate challenges to her appointees by only putting
forth candidates that are more likely to be accepted and thus a candidate that is less likely to
effectively advocate for the presidential agenda.
Even once a nominee is confirmed, the president risks losing their influence over the
them if that appointee assimilates into the culture of the agency. Even ardent loyalists may begin
to waver after they become part of an agency culture and they begin to develop empathy for the
mission of the careerists or are convinced of its efficacy by those career experts (Wilson 1989,
Fenno 1959, Bertelli and Grose 2011). Presidents can try to prevent this agency capture by
frequently reassigning appointees, but doing so prevents appointees from ever learning enough
about the culture, mission, and subject area of an agency to effectively lead it (Ban and Ingraham
1990). Once political appointees are placed, moreover, they are vulnerable to political pressure
from Congress and from their careerist subordinates that they may succumb to in an effort to
maintain control over the agency (Warren 2012). Presidents have recognized this danger and
responded by prioritizing loyalty over competence when selecting appointees.
The president faces a shortage of candidates who are both qualified for policy making
positions and loyal to the president and their priorities. Beginning in earnest under the Reagan
Administration, loyalty became the most important quality an appointee could have (Lewis 2008;
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Edwards 2001; Moe 1985; Cohen 1998). This is a rational choice for a president who must
control a bureaucracy bent on pursuing its own policies (Heclo 1977; Wood and Waterman
1994). As the president tries to match the public’s perhaps unreachable expectations, they cannot
waste resources trying to corral a rogue political appointee, especially when they had the chance
to appoint someone who will be faithful to the presidential agenda. As Reagan aide Lyn Nofziger
succinctly summed it up, “As far as I’m concerned, anyone who supported Reagan is competent”
(Lewis 2008, 27). As a result, most presidential appointees come from backgrounds in law,
legislatures, lobbying, or campaigns and do not have the expected public management skills of
someone expected to run an organization as complicated as a federal agency (Cohen 1998). As
presidents prioritized loyalty, they abandoned professional standards and either assumed or
hoped that those loyal appointees will still be able to achieve policy goals.
However, appointees without strong backgrounds in public management or similar
experience are often unable to drive federal agencies to comply with presidential preferences.
Studies of political appointee’s ability to change agency behavior have found that loyalty to the
president has no effect on their ability to make change; whereas, previous experience in public
management, a charismatic personality, and the appointees ability to design a plan to achieve
their goals are decisive qualities (Light 1987; Edwards 2001). Appointees with those
qualifications are better able to make career civil servants responsive to their needs and take
advantage of the resources available to move the presidential agenda forward (Light 1987).
Despite this, presidents often choose young, inexperienced former campaign workers or those
with powerful familial connections because those candidates guarantee loyalty (Moynihan and
Roberts 2010). As a result, presidents face a catch-22 trade-off between competency and loyalty
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where sacrificing either qualities reduces their ability to control the bureaucracy via
politicization.
Finally, political appointees’ lack of competency can have a detrimental effect on the
performance of agencies, damaging the president’s reputation and ability to control an agency.
Among many cases of inexperienced political appointees, the story of Michael Brown who was
appointed by President Bush to head the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
stands out. Brown and the rest of the senior Bush appointees to FEMA were drawn from
Republican political campaigns and had no experience in emergency management (Moynihan
and Roberts 2010). Unsurprisingly, their management of Hurricane Katrina was disastrous.
According to career civil servants, the appointees inability to understand the culture and demands
of FEMA was a driving force behind the agencies’ dismal response to the disaster (Moynihan
and Roberts 2010). While anecdotes of foolish and incompetent political appointees paint
important pictures and are common throughout the literature, Lewis (2008) is the only
systematic, empirical analysis of politicizations’ effects on agency performance.
Lewis (2008) finds that politicized federal programs received significantly lower scores
on the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) and the Federal Human Capital Survey
(FHCS), measures that capture the efficiency, planning, and morale of federal agencies. His
findings are among the first to the show the deleterious effect of politicization across broad
sections of the federal bureaucracy across multiple years. Federal programs that are politicized
design, plan, and manage federal programs less effectively than those that are not politicized
(Lewis 2008). Additionally, political appointees are, on the whole, not as respected as career
civil servants in similar positions of power (Lewis 2008). Presidents, however, are sensitive to
politicization’s potential effects on agency performance and are less likely to politicize agencies
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with higher proportions of technical employees like NASA (Lewis, 2008). These political
appointees’ poor management of federal programs undermine their ability to bring the
president’s program to fruition while also endangering the president’s reputation to the general
public. Politicization is not a free method of political control; politicizing agencies can actually
weaken presidential control over the bureaucracy and threatens their political goals.
Politicization offers presidents an opportunity to embed their preferences within agencies
and place loyal leaders at the helm of the very federal agencies that may seek to resist the
presidential agenda. It has become the most widely used tool of bureaucratic control since the
Reagan administration and nearly all federal agencies and bureaus of import report, at least
indirectly, to a political appointee. Appointees have become an integral part of our federal
bureaucracy, despite generally being less competent than career civil servants. That sacrifice of
expertise is often justified as a means to ensure democratic control over the bureaucracy, but
there are significant doubts that political appointees are actually able to deliver that control.
Politicization and Agency Responsiveness
Previous attempts to measure the political responsiveness of federal agencies have largely
focused on case studies of individual agencies. Previous studies have generally followed the
model set by Wood and Waterman’s (1991) study of whether president’s mechanism of
bureaucratic control were effective across seven different agencies and departments. Their
findings showed that political appointees are the most important instrument of political control
confirms and forms a basis for this study. However, Wood and Waterman, Moe’s study of the
Federal Trade Commission, the Labor Relations Board, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (1982) and Stewart and Cromartie’s (1982) work on the Federal Trade Commission
all used dummy variables which flipped at the beginning of an administration and fail to explain
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how the president is able to exert influence across agencies, some of which are not directly under
his control (Wood and Waterman, 1993). To better measure this, one could collect a set of case
studies and try to measure a consistently coded variable, a model called process tracing. This can
work, but is not efficient and is vulnerable to the large variation in bureaucratic action across
different agencies and changes across time within similar agencies (Rudalevige, 2009).
Additionally, inconsistency and subjectivity in coding of the variable can undermine the
accuracy of a study.
More recently, scholars have used the distribution of goods and services by agencies to
operationalize presidential influence over agency action. Berry, Burden, and Howell (2010) and
Bertelli and Grose (2009) find that districts represented by the same party as the president are
more likely to receive grants from federal agencies, but they use a dichotomous variable that
does not capture the nuance of politicization within an agency. Hubak’s (2010) findings support
those claims using the same data from Lewis (2008) that is used in this paper. He finds that
politicization increases federal funding to swing states and districts sharing a partisan
identification as the president. Using federal grant distribution provides a variable of interest
that is common and objective across the federal bureaucracy and represents a major step in
measuring the effectiveness of politicization.
While certainly important, funding fails to capture the political struggle over the rules and
regulations that dictate the actual impact and reach of our laws. For example, previous work
using funding as a dependent variable would miss the potential effects of politicization on OCR’s
treatment of Title IX because federal funding has never once been revoked. Moreover, in our
current age of extreme polarization, presidents could rely more on virtue signaling to their
constituents rather than pushing pork to individual states and districts. A new rule fulfilling a
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campaign promise provides a good to a far larger proportion of a president’s constituency at a
lower dollar cost then a medical center in a single district. While there has not been significant
empirical research into the potential effects of polarization on pork politics, Sideman (2019)
suggests that changes among the preferences’ of party members over government spending could
reduce the electoral incentive for Republicans to pursue pork and undermining its use as a
variable to measure political control.
Directing federal funding also requires less policy expertise and less institutional backing
than writing and publishing regulations and so could overstate the impact of political appointees
as a measurement for political control. Appointees can depend upon their statutory authority to
direct discretionary federal funding priorities. Whereas, testing political appointees ability to
influence the content of rules in potentially hostile agencies targets the weakest points in their
authority as political interlopers without subject area knowledge. The long and detailed
rulemaking process provides career civil servants far more opportunities to subvert presidential
priorities and to insert their own and thus gives a better estimate of the real influence of political
appointees
The cumulative work laid out argues that politicization and centralization are central
aspects of presidential control of the bureaucracy, but there is little generalizable, empirical
evidence that politicization is an effective tool, nor about how the two processes interact. This
leads me to propose several potential hypotheses.
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Methods
Hypothesis:
H1: Effectiveness Hypothesis: Increased politicization of an agency should lead to a reduced
likelihood that rules are changed by OIRA.
The literature of case studies and quantitative work with federal funding indicate that I
should find the expected negative relationship between politicization and OIRA Change. The
previous studies discussed have shown that political appointees have been effective means of
presidential control over bureaucratic outcomes in those particular cases. A positive finding
would confirm that political appointees do effectively translate the president’s priorities into new
rules. Moreover, in confirming these more particular studies, a positive finding would support
my use of OIRA review as a measure of political control. A negative finding would cut against
much of the existing literature and require a rethinking of how presidents can try to realize their
agenda.

H2: The Duration Hypothesis: OIRA will review rules promulgated by more politicized
agencies for fewer days.
If rules produced by more politicized agencies are more similar to presidential
preferences, then OIRA will need to spend less time reviewing and suggesting changes so I
expect to find a negative relationship between politicization and the duration of OIRA review.
The further a rule is from the president’s views, the longer it should take for OIRA to review it.
Additionally, OIRA should want to move rules that are in line with the presidential agenda more
quickly through review so they can be published and take effect. A positive finding would
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provide greater nuance and confirmation of political appointees ability to produce rules that are
reflect the presidential agenda. While complexity can also effect this result, one can assume that
rules in line with the presidential agenda are no more likely to be complex than those that are not
and so complexity should be randomly distributed.

H3: The Performance Hypothesis: Increasing politicization in agencies with already high
levels of politicization will impair agency performance to the extent that OIRA is more likely to
review those agency’s rules with changes.
There is a significant literature that argues that there are performance costs that
accompany, and can even outweigh, the increased control provided by politicization (Lewis
2008; Huber and McCarty 2004). Political appointees lack the necessary experience in public
management, subject-area expertise, and incentives to develop and maintain long-term plans or a
professional culture (Lewis 2008; Cohen 1998; Heclo 1977; Suleiman 2003). In this case, too
many political appointees can impede agencies ability to produce well-drafted regulations not
just because they lack the technical ability to write laws, but also because they do not have the
experience building the coalition needed to create rules. Perhaps they do not know what special
interest groups to reach out to or what congressional staff they must please to ensure that
regulation will not be challenged. Moreover, inexperienced leadership can destroy the
professional culture necessary to create well-written regulations (Cohen 1998). Much of this
literature calls to find a balance between appointees and career civil servants to take advantage of
the dynamism and new ideas of the appointees as well as the experience and expertise of the
career appointees (Aberbach et al 1981, Bok 2003, Krause et al 2006).
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If these scholars are correct, then increasing politicization in already heavily politicized
agencies will increase the likelihood that OIRA will make changes to a rule. Regardless of their
particular policy positions, all presidents should prefer well-written regulations and highly
politicized agencies are shown to manage projects less efficiently and develop less
comprehensive plans for future action both of which could produce rules in greater need of
correction. The need for correction in this case would not come from a lack of congruence
between the rule and the president’s agenda, but rather from shoddy drafting. By testing for
performance-effects, I recognize that not all politicization is equal. While some levels of
politicization may reduce the need for centralized clearance, there is a possibility that higher
levels actually increase it.

Testing the Hypothesis:
Dependent Variable: OIRA Review
The central innovation of this paper is the use of OIRA decision data as a measure of
congruence between published rules and the president’s preferences. As a division within OMB,
OIRA depends upon the president for political relevancy, which has engrained the prioritization
of the presidential agenda into its institutional culture. As a result, OIRA works to align rules
with the president’s preferences (West, 2005; Shapiro, 2005; Wiseman, 2009; West, 2006;
Golden, 2000; Gailmard and Patty, 2013; Yackee, 2019). Because OIRA review operates on the
level of the individual regulation, it allows me to study the actual policy that agencies produce
using a single, generalizable variable. Using rules as the unit of analysis allows me to directly
measure politicization’s effects on policy outputs instead of relying on proxy variables or
subjective analysis of the content of rules.
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All data on OIRA decisions is available to the public on their website, which details
every rule reviewed by OIRA from 1981 until the present (available at
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/XMLReportList). OIRA provides each rule’s RIN, the office
of the agency which promulgated it, date received and date completed, resulting decision, if the
rule was economically significant or major, and the stage in which the rule was reviewed. Use of
the direct administrative records is the standard source in previous academic work studying the
function of OIRA (Balla, Deets, and Maltzman, 2011; Croley, 2003; Haeder and Yackee, 2018).
To create a variable that captures whether a rule matches presidential preferences, I first
selected all economically significant rules. While this might seem to eliminate whole sections of
relevant rules, the standards for economic significance are malleable and political so that any
rule important to the president is likely to be marked as economically significant. OIRA can
categorize a rule as significant if it meets any of the following standards: it would have a sizable
impact on the economy (more than $100 million per year); create any contradictions or
inconsistencies with the current law or regulation; or ran counter to the president’s regulatory
mission (Wiseman, 2009). Put together, these conditions give the president the option to mark
essentially any rule as economically significant and so for the sake of measuring deviation from
the presidential agenda, I use rules that were deemed important by the president. This is also a
standard choice in previous work studying OIRA.
OIRA returns rules marked with one of eight classifications: “consistent with change,”
“consistent without change,” “withdrawn,” “returned for reconsideration,” “judicial or statutory
review,” “suspended review,” “emergency,” or “Improperly submitted.” I first drop any rule
marked as “judicial or statutory review,” “suspended review,” “emergency,” or “improperly
submitted” because they not represent any substantive change or approval by OIRA, but rather
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describe unrelated circumstances. Put together, the dropped categories represent less than 2
percent of the data set. OIRA returns a rule as “consistent with change” when they have made
textual change to the submitted rule and “consistent without change” when they have made none.
93.5 percent of all rules are either consistent with change (68.5 percent) or consistent without
change (25 percent). OIRA may also signal to agencies to withdraw (4.1 percent of the dataset)
a rule or mark it as “returned for reconsideration” (0.51 percent) if that the rule is too far from
presidential preference. Strong presidential control of the rules making process should produce
rules which do not require changes if they are reviewed. To measure that, I constructed a
dichotomous variable called OIRA Change that marked all rules that OIRA returns as “consistent
with change,” “withdrawn,” or “returned for reconsideration” as a 1. Rules returned as
“consistent without change” are left as 0.
While “withdrawn” and “returned for reconsideration” represent more severe cases of
OIRA change to a rule, they represent such a small fraction of the rules in the data set that
creating a continuous variable has methodological concerns. Acknowledging the opportunity for
a more nuanced measure of changes made by OIRA, I constructed a continuous, ordinal variable,
called OIRA Severity that categorized “withdrawn” as a 3, “returned for reconsideration” as a 2,
“consistent with change” as a 1, and “consistent without change” as a 0 and used it as my
dependent variable in my main model. The results showed a strong, statistically significant
negative relationship between politicization and changes made by OIRA. This confirmed my
results using a dichotomous variable so I continued to use the dichotomous variable to avoid
issues of small sample size on the parts of OIRA Severity that differentiate it from OIRA Change.
Additionally, I test presidential control using the variable Duration which measures the
number of days between the date OIRA receives a regulation to review and the date they publish
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their decision. This is a simple numerical variable derived from the dates in the OIRA records.
Duration is a less direct measurement of presidential control, but provides added nuance to my
analysis as it is a continuous variable.
OIRA Change fails to capture the extent of the suggested change by OIRA so minor edits
have the same effect as major rewrites. This is a weakness of the variable, but OIRA does not
have any record of the significance of the change and so any change will flip the dichotomous
variable. There is no public data that captures the extent of change made by OIRA and the data
can only be collected through archival research at OIRA (Haeder and Yackee 2018). To
compensate for this, I ran my model with Duration as a confounding variable, assuming that
more significant changes to a rule will require a longer review period than minor edits. This did
not affect the results of the test at all, strengthening my results even without a measure for extent
of change. Even if I cannot capture the degree of changes by OIRA for a given rule, I am likely
underestimating the effects of politicization by weighing minor edits—which likely happen more
frequently—equally to major edits and thus holding appointees to a high, but clearly attainable
standard. Even with that distortion, I still found a strong, independent effect for politicization.

Independent Variable: Politicization
My measures for politicization are based on David Lewis’ The Politics of Presidential
Appointments (2008), the most comprehensive quantitative attempt to measure politization.
There are two main sources used to measure politicization: the Plum Book and the Office of
Personnel Management’s Central Personnel Data File (CPDF). Published by Congress since
1960, the Plum Book contains every federal policymaking and confidential position subject to
appointment, providing a broad and comprehensive index of appointments that covers all of the
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OIRA data. The book, however, is only published every four years, which limits its utility
analyzing the vast majority of rules that are reviewed in non-election years as well as in
measuring the variation of politicization within each administrations. In contrast, OPM has
annual statistics of appointed positions dating back to 1988 that cuts across not just the
department level, but also the bureau. This allows me to examine the variation not just between
the Departments of the Interior and the Treasury, but also between the Bureau of Land
management and the Internal Revenue Service, for example. Additionally, the CPDF data
includes more detailed statistics on the personnel makeup of agencies, including a management
categorization that is crucial to measuring politicization.
For the years from 1998 and 2005, I was able to use Lewis’ (2008) dataset published on
his public website. To extend the dataset through 2015, I used data sent to me by Professor
Lewis from his 2019 working paper Partisan Procurement: Contracting with the United States
Federal Government with Carl Dahlström and Mihály Fazekas. In this second dataset, Lewis was
not able to get precise data from OPM on Senate confirmed appointees and had to rely on the
federal employee pay scale. Under this alternate method, he counts the number of employees on
the executive pay scale because the EX pay is usually reserved for Senate confirmed positions.
This method likely undercounts Senate confirmed positions, but when I combined the two
datasets, the overlapping years (2000-2005) had essentially analogous figures for those Senate
confirmed positions.
Using the CPDF limits our study to post-1988 and removes the pioneering use of OIRA
by the Reagan administration, but our time frame still covers variation across four
administrations with even partisan distribution. OPM has not yet posted personnel data for years
post-2015 so the final year of the Obama administration and the first three years of the Trump
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administration will not be included in this study. While it would be ideal to include those years,
the data is simply not available at the moment. This still left us with more than 3000
economically significant rules reviewed by OIRA in this time frame.
The other major disadvantage of the CPDF data was that the system used to code
agencies does not match the one used by OIRA. 74.6 percent (2019 of 3042) of the agencies
which promulgated regulations in the OIRA system had an identical match in the CPDF. Of the
remaining quarter, I was able to find politicization data for 569 of those 824 regulations (69%) in
the Plum Book. As mentioned above, the Plum Book is only published every four years so to
match politicization data to regulations reviewed between publications I used data from the
following publication. For example, if a regulation was reviewed in 2014, I used politicization
data from the 2016 Plum Book. While neither the preceding or following Plum Book offers a
perfect record of the politicization in the intermediate time, the following at least describes
appointees of that particular administration. Considering that different presidents allocate
appointees differently based on their own priorities, the 2016 Plum Book records from the
Obama administration are more likely to describe politicization in 2014 than in 2018.
Of those 824 regulations without a direct match in the CPDF, the EPA issued 432. There
was no direct match with the CPDF because OIRA had broken down the EPA by division (e.g.
the Office of Water), rather than keeping it whole like Lewis CPDF data. Because of the EPA’s
history of adversarial relationships with presidents of both parties, demonstrated by the fact that
it produced more than 12% of the rules in the case study, it was important to include them in the
primary test. In this case, the EPA is a relatively small agency (compared to a cabinet agency)
with a homogenous institutional culture and so I classified those regulations under the Lewis’
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EPA data as a single entity. I ran the regression with and without the EPA and it produced
similar coefficients and both were statistically significant.
The CPDF provides data on the number of political appointees and career civil servants
broken down by varying level of authority. The jobs available to political appointees in
descending order of authority are presidential nomination and senate confirmation (PAS), the
Senior Executive Service (SES), and Schedule C. A model of the federal bureaucratic hierarchy
can be found in Figure 1. PAS positions include the most visible and well-known political
appointees and are explicitly authorized by the Constitution. Officially, the president can fill
more than 1,100 PAS position, but only about 900 of those are policymaking positions. Another
200+ are U.S. attorneys, marshals, or ambassadors, limiting the president to only 540 key PAS
positions in cabinet departments and major independent agencies in 2015. These include
Secretaries, deputy secretaries, and a select group of under or assistant secretaries, inspectors
general, and chief financial officer.
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Figure 1: Federal Civilian Personnel System Appointment Authorities (Lewis 2008)
SES positions lie between PAS jobs and the competitive civil service. Created in the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, the SES is made up of 7,000 political appointees and career
civil servants who OPM allocates across agencies based on their own estimates and agency
requests (Lewis 2008). SES positions include positions such as Deputy Assistant Secretaries,
Chiefs of Staff, and Deputy General Counsels. This system was designed to give presidents the
ability to change how they allocate human resources and to prioritize certain areas of policy that
may be important to their agenda across the federal bureaucracy and so it is procedurally easy for
the president to move career and noncareer SES officers between positions.
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Schedule C positions are the final policy-determining positions that presidents can fill.
Originally created by President Eisenhower, Schedule C positions are often special or
confidential assistants to Senate confirmed appointees, legislative liaisons, and directors of
communications or press. Each individual Schedule C job is specifically created by a president
and disappears whenever the appointee vacates it. In 2015, there were 1,688 total Schedule C
positions in cabinet departments and major independent agencies.
Simply using the number of political appointments in an agency as a measure for
politicization fails to capture the structural differences among agencies. These include the
agencies’ size—the Center for Medicare and Medicaid has far more appointees than the Farm
Service Agency, but relative to its total size, the Farm Service Agency has more appointees than
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid. Moreover, some agencies and departments have
relatively hierarchal or flat structures that either amplify or diminish the influence of political
appointees. An appointee atop a highly hierarchical agency where they are one of only a few toplevel managers will have greater influence on policy than an appointee in an agency with many
relatively equal managers. This diversity creates varying levels of insulation from presidential
influence across agencies and any measure of politicization must take into account the design
and insulation of the agency being studied (Lewis 2003).
Given those complicating factors, the primary test in this paper will use data from the
OPM’s CPDF to construct two measures of politicization. In each case the numerator of the ratio
is the same: the total number of Senate confirmed, noncareer SES, and Schedule C appointees.
This is simply all of the president’s policy relevant appointees. But, choosing who are the career
civil servants who have a hand in deciding policy is more difficult as it depends upon the
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structure of a particular agency and the role of particular bureaucrats in drafting rules. So I will
measure politicization with two different denominators.
The first matches Lewis’ (2008) measure of politicization and uses a generous
classification of “managers” from OPM records that classify managers on a two to eight scale
where a 2 means:
Position requires the exercise of supervisory or managerial responsibilities
that meet, at least, the minimum requirements for application of the
General Schedule Supervisory Guide or similar standards of minimum
supervisory responsibility specified by position classification standards or
other directives of the applicable pay schedule or system (OPM 2006 The
Guide to Personnel Data Standards)
Following Lewis, I also define manager in the most generous way—counting any person
with supervisory responsibility—from team leaders to executives. This denominator
assumes that bureaucrats further down the chain of command still have a substantive
influence on new regulations. This will be especially true in agencies with a relatively flat
authority structure, but could also be true across all agencies as these career civil servant
managers are likely the ones directing the research used to write rules or could even be
responsible for drafting the actual text of a new rule. While high-level appointees and
bureaucrats, like those in the SES, get much of the public attention and credit for
designing policies, lower-ranking career civil servants likely also have significant
influence on the content of a rule. A generous count of managers, however, could
understate the level of politicization and then exaggerate the actual effect of political
appointees on policy. Additionally, managers is a flexible definition that is defined
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differently in varying departments and so the variable can fluctuate across the
bureaucracy. I call this variable Lewis Politicization.
To avoid that potential distortion, I constructed another variable called SES
Politicization that uses the total number of SES, Senate confirmed, and Schedule C
positions in the agency as a denominator. This measure provides a better image of how
politicized the upper crust of an agency or bureau is. The SES includes only the highest
level bureaucrats, all above the General Schedule and below Level III of the Executive
Schedule. The president can appoint up to 10% of the total SES, though no more 25% in
any single agency—a far higher proportion than total number of managers.
This measure of politicization better captures both hierarchal agencies or the
condition where the highest-ranking bureaucrats and appointees have greater control over
the rules their agencies produces. This is particularly relevant to my study as I am
interested in how political appointees influence the content of new pieces of regulatory
law, not whether they manage to enforce existing laws in line with presidential priorities.
It is rational to assume that directional policy choices occur at the executive level of
agencies rather than among small-time project managers. In that case, those executive
level civil servants will decide whether new regulations follow presidential priorities and
SES Politicization will better capture agency politicization. These two measures of
politicization describe different stories of policy formulation, but produce similar results
in the regression analysis and have a correlation of .561.
Confounding Explanations and Controls
To examine this relationship, I constructed five confounding variables. The likelihood of
OIRA substantively changing a rule and the level of extant politicization are both affected by
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variables that fit into two categories: presidential influence over Congress and a potential
ideology gap between the president and an agency. A popular president will have more influence
over Congress to approve their appointments as well as to produce legislation that more closely
matches their preferences. I first measure that political capital directly with Presidential
Approval, which is taken from Gallup’s Presidential Approval Rating and matched to the day
OIRA receives any given regulation to review. This was straightforward for the Obama
Administration because Gallup provided data on a daily basis with few exceptions. From 19882008, however, Gallup measured the approval rating twice a month and so I assigned the value
for Presidential Approval by the next possible date after the regulation was received. I used the
subsequent date because it must capture the political capital of the president at the time of the
review and it is unlikely that the mundane and obscure choice to review a rule will significantly
affect a macro-level variable such as presidential approval rating.
Additionally, I controlled for the Point in the Administration, a simple ordinal value of
the number of years a president has been in office. The length of a president’s administration has
a dual effect on politization; presidents are likely to have fewer political appointees and thus rely
on OIRA more in the beginning and end of their administration as they have either not had the
opportunity to appoint any or the appointees leave as the administration comes to a close.
Additionally, presidential influence over Congress generally goes down as time passes after their
first election so the president may be more likely to use OIRA to review legislation that is less
likely to driven by the presidential agenda.
A Senate controlled by the president’s party is less likely to hold up a president’s
appointees and a friendly, unified Congress will write more favorable legislation to the
president’s agenda. To account for this, I created the dichotomous variables Unified Senate and
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Unified All, which flip to one if the president’s party controls just the Senate or the Senate and
the House of Representatives, respectively.
Previous presidential attention is an ordinal variable that adds up the number of times
the rule was formally reviewed by OIRA as multiple reviews captures the intensity of
presidential interest in any specific regulation (Haeder and Yackee 2018). If a president chooses
to review a rule multiple times, it likely a particular area of interest. In that case, the president
would likely assign more political appointees to an agency responsible for a policy area of
particular interest as well as review the individual related rules promulgated.
Presidents are more likely to use tools of political control such as politicization and OIRA
review on agencies that do not share their preferences or are unresponsiveness to the President.
Both President Bushes and Bill Clinton increased the number and penetration of appointees in
liberal and conservative agencies respectively (Lewis, 2008). While there is a consensus that
presidents use OIRA to check opposite-ideology agencies, new empirical evidence suggests that
OIRA is more likely used to check extreme liberal agencies than extreme conservative ones
(Haeder and Yackee, 2018). So, in addition to controlling for an ideological divergence or match
between the president and an agency, I also control for extreme liberal agencies.
There are general conceptions of the ideological bias of various agencies based on their
founding mission or regulatory history. For example, one can reasonably assume that the
institutional bias within the Environmental Protection Agency likely favors the Democratic Party
and the Department of Commerce favors the Republican Party. But, unlike for the president or
members of Congress, there are no roll call votes for political scientists to use to place agencies
on the political spectrum. To measure agency ideology, previous studies have used ClintonLewis scores, which are based on the expertise of 23 Washington observers and academics
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focused on bureaucratic politics. Clinton and Lewis sent out a questionnaire asking those experts
to rate 82 departments and agencies following these directions:
Please see below a list of United States government agencies that were in existence
between 1988 and 2005. I am interested to know which of these agencies have policy
views due to law, practice, culture, or tradition that can be characterized as liberal or
conservative. Please place a check mark (√) in one of the boxes next to each agency—
“slant Liberal, Neither Consistently, slant Conservative, Don’t know.”
Clinton and Lewis then used the expert survey response to derive estimates of which agencies
lean ideologically liberal or conservative—controlling for expertise of the respondent and some
thresholds for what constitutes liberal or conservative. Clinton and Lewis then created
dichotomous liberal and conservative variables that flip if an agencies’ Clinton-Lewis variable is
statistically distinguishable from the average agency rating. I took those variables and created
two more dichotomous variables: Ideological Dissonance and Ideological Match. I marked
Ideological Dissonance as a 1 if a Democratic president reviewed a rule promulgated by a
conservative agency or if a Republican president reviewed a rule issued by a liberal agency.
Ideological Match was marked as a 1 if a conservative agency’s rule was reviewed by a
Republican president or a liberal agency’s by a Democrat.
Altogether, in addition to these eight confounding variables, I constructed two variables
to measure politicization within agencies and three variables to measure changes made by OIRA
during review. I will proceed to use these variables to test my three main hypothesis using
logistic and OLS regressions.
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Results
In the following section, I present the results of the multiple models I constructed to
falsify the three hypotheses presented earlier: effectiveness, duration, and
performance/diminishing marginal returns. For each hypothesis, I first present and discuss the
results of the modeled estimates for my measure of politicization, SES Politicization. For each
hypothesis, I then run the same tests, but use an alternative measure, called Lewis Politicization,
derived from Lewis (2008). I also run supplementary tests for each hypothesis that use redefine
variables or data sets to further test the relationship that I am investigating, in addition to
replicating the tests with measure from Lewis (2008).
Lewis Politicization measures the politicization of the whole agency, rather than the
politicization just among the top level civil servants. Using this measure in addition to SES
Politization ensures that this model captures the potential influence of mid-tier managers. As
discussed in the methods section, this measure could also overemphasizes parts of the
bureaucracy that are less relevant to the formulation of new regulations and more so relevant to
the enforcement of preexisting rules. As a result, agencies tend to have lower levels of
politicization using Lewis’ (2008) measure with distribution shown in Graph 1 vs. the
distribution of SES Politicization shown in Graph 2. Incorporating both measures into each of
my models protects my tests from biasing against either part of the bureaucracy. I also use Lewis
Politicization to provide a reference point for my own measure as it is a widely used and
published method of measuring politicization (Lewis 2008; Gersen and Berry 2010; Hubak
2010).
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H1: Effectiveness Hypothesis
SES Politicization Model
Table 1: Marginal Effects and Regression Coefficients, Logistic Model with SES
Politicization
Variable
SES Politicization
Presidential Attention
Unified Senate
Unified Government
Presidential Approval
Point in Administration
Ideological Dissonance
Ideological Similarity
Liberal
Constant

Model With Controls
Marginal Effects with
Standard Errors
-.003 (.0003)
-0.012 (.005)
0.145 (.037)***
-0.094 (.039)
0.002 (.001)
0.013 (.004)**
-0.157 (.025)***
-0.145 (.026)***
0.198 (.021)***
0.760 (.008)***

Model With Controls
β Coefficient with
Standard Errors
-0.012(.002)***
-0.0678 (.030)
1.243 (.246)***
-0.892 (253)
0.019 (.005)
0.124 (.025)**
0.894 (.164)***
-.740 (.169)***
1.378 (145)***
0.269 (0.300)

Note: *** p <.000, ** p <.01, * p <.05; n=2181
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To test the Effectiveness Hypothesis, I first ran a logistic regression using the 2,197-rule
data set with the dichotomous OIRA Change as the dependent variable and SES Politicization as
the independent variable. I expect to see a negative relationship where OIRA is less likely to
make changes to rules promulgated by highly politicized agencies. The coefficient of the
modeled relationship should be negative, statistically significant, and substantively large.
Table 1 contains the coefficients and standard deviations for my dependent and control
variables from this test. It also contains the estimated marginal effects in order to assess the
magnitude of the relationship. I find support for the Effectiveness hypothesis as among all
agencies, on average, as politicization of an agency increases by one point, the probability of
OIRA overturning the agency’s decision by .3 percentage points, after controlling for all of the
other variables in the model. The 95 confidence interval for the marginal effect, (-0.0041,
-0.002), did not cross zero, and the results do not change at either boundary. These marginal
effects persist despite controlling for important factors such as ideological similarity between the
president and the agencies producing the rules or Congress who writes the statute.
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On its face, this may seem like a small change in OIRA Review, but politicization rarely
increases by only a single point. There are relatively few civil servants, both career and
appointee, at the SES level—the agencies with rules under review in this data set have an mean
of 93 total SES positions, but also a standard deviation of 103. The distribution of SES
Politicization is in Graph 1. As a result, SES Politicization has a standard deviation of about 26
percent implying that an average change in politicization will cause a significant change in the
likelihood of a substantial OIRA review.
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These results demonstrate that politicization is an effective means of presidential control
over the content of rules promulgated by federal agencies and confirm the Effectiveness
Hypothesis. Rules submitted by agencies in which political appointees make up less than 40
percent of the upper-level (SES and above) bureaucracy rules have a greater than 75 percent
chance of being substantially reviewed. This trend is visualized in Graph 3. The dichotomous
nature of the dependent variable OIRA Change allows me to construct predicted probabilities
from the logistic regression, meaning that a point on the graph represents the likelihood that
OIRA make substantive changes to a rule promulgated at that level of politicization. Agencies
without any political appointees are more likely to have regulations changed by review than
those exclusively staffed by political appointees. Fewer agencies have this high level
politicization and so the confidence intervals are wider due to the smaller sample size, but even
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their upper bounds tell the same story. For example, the confidence intervals at 10 percent SES
Politicization (0.782, 0.824) do not overlap with those at 40 percent (0.733, 0.769), which do not
cross the confidence intervals at 70 percent (0.658, 0.724). The predicated probabilities are listed
in Table 2. Functionally, this means there is a meaningful difference in the likelihood of OIRA
changing a rule as politicization varies across a single standard deviation.
Table 2: Likelihood of OIRA Change at 10 percent Margins of Politicization
Variable
Politicization
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%

Model With Controls
Likelihood of OIRA Review with
Standard Errors
-0.023 (.004)***
0.818 (.012)
0.803 (.107)
0.786 (.0127)
.769(.019)
0.751 (.005)
0.732 (.026)
0.712 (.054)
0.691 (.062)
0.670(.068)
0.625 (.073)

Lewis Politicization
To strengthen these results, I ran the same test on OIRA Change using Lewis’ (2008)
measure of politicization with “managers” as the denominator. The full results appear in Table 3.
Using Lewis Politicization, this test predicts that politicization will have a larger effect on the
likelihood of OIRA changing a rule than the previous measures of politicization. On average,
across all agencies, for every unit increase in politicization, the likelihood of OIRA making a
substantive change goes down by .4 percentage points after controlling for all other variables in
the model. The beta-coefficients and derived marginal effects for this test can be found in Table
3. This result matches our theoretical expectation as Lewis Politicization’s large denominator
will produce lower levels of politicization than SES Politization and thus a larger effect when
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OIRA Change is regressed on it. This story produced a similar, albeit stronger, relationship
between politicization and substantive OIRA review as SES Politicization, strengthening the
results from the first test.

Table 3: Marginal Effects and Regression Coefficients, Logistic Model with Lewis
Politicization
Variable
Lewis Politicization
Presidential Attention
Unified Senate
Unified Government
Presidential Approval
Point in Administration
Ideological Dissonance
Ideological Similarity
Liberal
Constant

Model Without Controls
Marginal Effects with
Standard Errors
-.004 (.001))
-0.009 (.005)
0.207 (.038)***
-0.155 (.039)
0.002 (.001)
0.017 (.004)**
-0.137 (.025)***
-0.128 (.026)***
-0.128 (.021)***
1.448 (.062)***

Model With Controls
β Coefficient with
Standard Errors
-0.023 (.004)***
-0.063 (.030)
1.349 (.250)***
-1.009 (.257)
0.016 (.005)
0.112 (.026)**
-0.898 (.172)***
-0.834 (.172)***
1.542 (.147)***
-.243 (0.294)

Note: *** p <.000, ** p <.01, * p <.05; n=2181
Additional Tests
To account for the limitations of using a dichotomous variable and to bolster these
results, I ran an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression that regressed OIRA Severity on SES
Politicization and Lewis Politicization. I constructed OIRA Severity by treating rules that OIRA
returned as “withdrawn” and “returned for reconsideration” as additional, more severe decisions
that reflected rules even further from the presidential agenda than “consistent with changes.”
This is generally true and may better capture how congruent a given rule is with the president’s
preferences. OIRA Severity creates a 4-point continuous measure of OIRA action that places
those results in descending order of congruence to the presidential agenda beginning with
“consistent without changes,” then “consistent with change,” then “returned for
reconsideration,” and finally “withdrawn.” The percent of each cases within the OIRA Change
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are in Table 4. The relative paucity of “withdrawn” and “returned for reconsideration” cases is
why I fold them into a dichotomous in the general model.
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for OIRA Severity
Variable
OIRA Change
Withdrawn (3)
Returned for Reconsideration (2)
Consistent with Change (1)
Consistent without Change (0)

Percentage of Cases within
OIRA Change (%)
.
22.9
71.66
.51
4.92

Cumulative Percentage of
Cases
.
22.9
94.56
95.08
100

Note: *** p <.000, ** p <.01, * p <.05
SES Politicization
Table 5: Regression Coefficients, OLS Model with and without “Controls” For OIRA
Severity

Variable
Politicization
Presidential Attention
Unified Senate
Unified Government
Presidential Approval
Point in Administration
Ideological Dissonance
Ideological Similarity
Liberal
Constant

Model Without
Controls (SES)
Coefficient with
Standard Errors
-0.006 (.000)***
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0.997 (.017)

Model With Controls
(SES)
β Coefficient with
Standard Errors
-0.006 (.001)***
-0.004 (.005)
-0.049 (.454)
0.015 (.045)
0.004 (0.001)***
-0.021 (.007)**
-0.177 (.027)***
-0.166 (.041)***
0.232 (.035)***
0.830 (.075)

Model with Controls
(Lewis)
β Coefficient with
Standard Errors
-0.006 (.001)***
-0.001 (.008)
0.021 (.045)
-0.054 (.046)
0.005 (.001)***
-0.018 (.007)
-0.176 (.042)***
0.170 (.042)***
0.291 (.037)***
0.665 (.072)

Note: *** p <.000, ** p <.01, * p <.05, n=2181
To test this new variable, I ran an OLS regression with the same set of controls on SES
Politicization and Lewis Politicization. If politicization produces rules that more in line with
president’s priorities, then increasing an agencies politicization will have a negative relationship
with OIRA Severity. I find the expected negative relationship. The coefficients are in Table 5.
On average, a one point increase in politicization leads to a half a point on the spectrum of OIRA
action, meaning, on average, OIRA’s actions are less severe as an agency’s politicization goes
up. This change is statistically significant. This relationship is best captured in Graph 4.
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Agencies with 0 percent politicization have a predicted OIRA Severity score of 1.11, just above a
1 which signifies “consistent with changes.” In comparison, a rule from an entirely politicized
agency is predicted to be a .41 out of the possible 4 where a 4 signifies the rule was withdrawn.
These results are in line with my general model and help confirm the Effectiveness Hypothesis.
To Further strengthen these results, I ran the model again using Lewis Politicization as the
dependent variable. The coefficients are in Table 5. I find the same expected negative
relationship and the results confirm all the findings mentioned above.
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H2: Duration Hypothesis
SES Politicization
Table 6: Regression Coefficients, Logistics Model with and without “Controls” For
Duration
Variable
SES Politicization
Presidential Attention
Unified Senate
Unified Government
Presidential Approval
Point in Administration
Ideological Dissonance
Ideological Similarity
Liberal
Constant

Model Without Controls
Coefficient with
Standard Errors
-0.283 (.055)***
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
56.409 (2.236)

Model With Controls
β Coefficient with
Standard Errors
-0.325 (.063)***
-0.256 (.937)
23.369 (5.006)
-36.658 (5.066)
0.043 (0.135)
-0.069 (.724)
-14.122 (4.686)
-21.406 (4.669)
10.720 (4.054)
61.678 (8.235)

Note: *** p <.000, ** p <.01, * p <.05, n=2181
Using the same dataset, I ran an OLS regression with the continuous variable Duration
and both measures of politicization used to test the Effectiveness Hypothesis. Duration counts
the number of days between when a rule is submitted to OIRA and when OIRA publishes a
decision. I expect to find a negative relationship between an agencies’ politicization and the
number of days OIRA takes to review a given regulation. Table 6 contains the coefficients and
standard deviations for Duration, my dependent variable, and all of the same controls. I find the
expected negative relationship between politicization and Duration—a percentage increase in
politicization leads to a reduction of about one-third of a day in review time. Graph 5 captures
the linear prediction of Duration at varying levels of politicization. The predicted duration of
OIRA review for agencies without any political appointees is just over 55 days and for agencies
where political appointees make up 20 percent or less of the SES, the predicted duration of
review is more than 50 days. In comparison, rules from agencies with politicization at or above
76

60 percent are predicted to be reviewed for just over 30 days, with OIRA only taking 13 days for
agencies entirely made up of political appointees. The confidence intervals for the values at 20
percent and 80 do not overlap so these differences are statistically significant. These results
suggest that highly politicized agencies are able to produce rules that require less review than
those from less politicized agencies.

Additional Tests
It is logical to assume, however, that making substantive changes to rules will require
more time than rules that are reviewed without changes regardless of an agency’s level of
politicization. In that case, those results could be driven by OIRA’s decision, not by
politicization. Graph 6 visualizes this theory, where 58 percent of rules which OIRA did not
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offer substantive change to were reviewed for 10 or fewer days compared to only 24 percent of
rules which OIRA edits. Moreover, about 28 percent of rules without OIRA changes were
reviewed for 1 or fewer days—the largest grouping across the entire data set. This along with our
results from the first hypothesis suggest that OIRA Change needs to be incorporated into our
Duration model.

It is logical to assume that OIRA will take longer to review rules that it chooses to make
changes to because it adds a whole additional process to the review. For rules which OIRA
made no changes to, Duration represents the amount of time it takes OIRA to decide that a rule
is in line with the presidential contrast. In contrast, for rules OIRA does make changes to,
Duration captures that same time plus the amount of time to actually rewrite the rule. Two
rules—one edited, one unchanged—both decided in 10 days represent two different phenomena
78

To test this initially, I added OIRA Change as a control variable to the regression on SES
Politicization. There still was a strong statistically significant relationship, but the coefficient of
SES Politicization dropped to a little over a quarter of a day (-0.258). Graph 7 demonstrate that
Duration is likely two cases separated by whether OIRA made substantive changes to them
during the review. The graph shows that a rule that OIRA did not make changes to from an
agency without any political appointees is predicted to be reviewed for less time than a rule with
changes from an agency with 70 percent politicization. It should be noted that politicization still
helps predict the duration of a review by OIRA regardless of what decision they may make—
further strengthening the results from the first sections. These findings supports the assumption
that rules with and without substantive changes may represent qualitatively different cases of
politicizations effects on the rulemaking process.
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To disentangle that relationship, I separated rules OIRA had made changes to and those
they had not and ran an interactive OLS regression model using the same control variables. The
data set of rules that OIRA did not offer edits to did not produce statistically significant results
(p-value of .445) likely because of the small size (n=521). But, the regression run on the rules
OIRA changed confirmed the Duration hypothesis. All of the coefficients and standard
deviations of the test are below in Table 7. Politicization’s coefficient of -0.350 days is
statistically significant and the graph showing the linear prediction of Duration at 10 percent
margins of politicization is largely unchanged. This test produced almost identical results as the
initial test with increases in politicization resulting in a reduction in review time by about one
third of a day.
Table 7: Regression Coefficients, Logistics Model with and without “Controls” For
Duration
Variable
SES Politicization
Presidential Attention
Unified Senate
Unified Government
Presidential Approval
Point in Administration
Ideological Dissonance
Ideological Similarity
Liberal
Constant

Model Without Controls
Coefficient with
Standard Errors
-0.280 (.078)***
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
56.409 (2.236)

Model With Controls
β Coefficient with
Standard Errors
-0.350 (.085)***
3.041 (1.898)
20.267 (6.066)***
-38.508 (6.012)***
-0.023 (0.168)
-0.151 (.977)
-10.260 (6.246)
-19.377 (6.047)
0.650 (5.400)
73.923 (11.046)

Note: *** p <.000, ** p <.01, * p <.05, n=1,625
I then ran a secondary test with an interactive model to test the null hypothesis Ho:
BChange =BNo Change where BChange is the regression coefficient for rules that OIRA made changes to
and BNo Change is the regression coefficient for rules that OIRA did not make changes to. To test
this, I created a dummy variable called Null Test that was the product of OIRA Change and
Duration and put them both into the regression analysis. In short, by including this additional
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term in the regression model, I can determine whether the two coefficients are statistically
distinguishable from one another. The coefficients of this test are in Table 8. The t-value of Null
Test was -24.08, making it not only statistically significant, but substantively large. Politicization
matters regardless of whether OIRA makes or does not make a change.
Table 8: Regression Coefficients, Logistics Model to Test Null Hypothesis
Variable
SES Politicization
OIRA Change
Null Test
Constant

Model With Controls
β Coefficient with
Standard Errors
-0.012 (.0122)
-16.753 (.695)***
1.000 (0.003)***
73.923 (11.046)

Note: *** p <.000, ** p <.01, * p <.05

Lewis Politicization
For the initial test on the entire dataset, I find a similar coefficient (-0.399) using Lewis
Politization as the independent variable. The results can be found in Table 9. The primary
difference between these results are the predicted Durations at varying levels of politicization
shown in Graph 8. While the slope is essentially the same, the predicted values using Lewis
Politicization are about three to five days shorter than those using SES Politicization. This is
likely due to the higher concentration of agencies on the low end of the Lewis Politicization
distribution, but this difference does not change the story told by either regression.
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Table 9: Regression Coefficients, Logistics Model with and without “Controls” For
Duration
Variable
SES Politicization
Presidential Attention
Unified Senate
Unified Government
Presidential Approval
Point in Administration
Ideological Dissonance
Ideological Similarity
Liberal
Constant

Model Without Controls
Coefficient with
Standard Errors
-0.279 (.123)***
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
50.518 (2.236)

Model With Controls
β Coefficient with
Standard Errors
-0.399 (.128)*
0.009 (.948)
20.723 (5.105)***
-38.576 (5.168)***
0.004 (0.136)*
-0.409 (.759)
-10.886 (4.703)
-19.721 (4.741)***
13.198 (4.111)**
56.405 (8.109)

Note: *** p <.000, ** p <.01, * p <.05, n=2181
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Additional Tests
Following the same logic as in the SES Politicization case, I then introduced OIRA Change into
the model. I first controlled for OIRA Change in the model that regressed Duration on Lewis
Politicization and found a similar -0.281 coefficient (p-value .032) as when SES Politicization
was used though the values at higher levels of politicization are smaller due to fewer cases. I then
split the results using OIRA Change as shown in Graph 9. I found similar results in this test,
though there was a less clear distinction between rules which had been changed by OIRA and
those that had not. Additionally, the linear prediction of Duration dropped into the negative at
the very highest levels of politicization, which is not possible, but also can indicate how short an
expected review would be for a rule promulgated by a highly politized agency that is not
changed by OIRA.
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Again, to disentangle the effects of OIRA Change from the effects of politicization, I separated
the data set by the dichotomous variable OIRA Change. The coefficient for rules not changed by
OIRA was not statistically significant (p-value of 0.757). For rules that OIRA had made changes
to, the coefficient went back up to over a third of a day. The full results of this test are in Table
10. This secondary test strengthen the results from the first and also confirm the Duration
Hypothesis.
Table 10: Regression Coefficients, OLS Model with and without “Controls” For Duration
Variable
SES Politicization
Presidential Attention
Unified Senate
Unified Government
Presidential Approval
Point in Administration
Ideological Dissonance
Ideological Similarity
Liberal
Constant

Model Without Controls
Coefficient with
Standard Errors
-0.211 (.163)***
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
58.306 (2.140)

Model With Controls
β Coefficient with
Standard Errors
-0.351 (.168)*
4.029 (1.914)
20.471 (6.179)***
-41.019 (6.229)***
-0.0586 (.171)*
-0.753 (1.000)
-6.493 (6.273)
-16.982 (6.154***
2.458 (5.519)**
56.405 (8.109)

Note: *** p <.000, ** p <.01, * p <.05; n=1625
As before, I then ran a secondary test with an interactive model to test the null hypothesis Ho:
BChange =BNo Change where BChange is the regression coefficient for rules that OIRA made changes to
and BNo Change is the regression coefficient for rules that OIRA did not make changes to. To test
this, I again added the dummy variable Null Test to the regression analysis, which allows me to
determine whether the two coefficients are statistically distinguishable from one another. The
results of the test are in Table 11. The t-value of Null Test was -256.91, making it not only
statistically significant, but substantively large. Politicization matters regardless of whether
OIRA makes or does not make a change.
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Table : Regression Coefficients, OLS Model to Test Null Hypothesis
Variable
SES Politicization
OIRA Change
Null Test
Constant

Model Without Controls
Coefficient with
Standard Errors
-0.280 (.078)***
.
.
56.409 (2.236)

Model With Controls
β Coefficient with
Standard Errors
-0.0315 (.023)
-17.290 (.702)***
1.000 (0.003)
73.923 (11.046)

H3: The Performance Hypothesis
SES Politicization

The results from my first test on the Effectiveness Hypothesis, seem to indicate that
increasing levels of politicization, even around 100 percent politicization, continue to reduce the
likelihood of OIRA making substantive changes to a rule. To further test the effects of increasing
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levels of politicization have on the OIRA action, I took the first derivative of the estimated
relationship between politicization and OIRA's action, and calculated it at intervals of 10 percent.
A positive finding for this hypothesis would find that in the most politicized agencies, there
would a be a positive relationship between additional politicization and the change in likelihood
that the OIRA would offer substantive changes to a rule. The size of that relationship would be
substantively larger for highly politicized agencies than for less politicized agencies. The results
can be found in Graph 10. Overlapping confidence intervals mean that I cannot infer a trend
from this test. However, all of the coefficients are negative, statistically significant, and with
even the upper-bounds of their confidence intervals are below zero. Even at the highest level of
politicization, an additional increase in politicization still reduced the likelihood of OIRA
Change, a negative result for the Performance Hypothesis.
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To further investigate the effects of politicization on heavily-politicized agencies, I
imposed an assumption of curvilinearity in my model to account for the possibility that
politicization is more consequential at different values of itself. It is logical that the existing level
of politicization will affect any subsequent politicization. I do not use this condition in the
previous tests because it is only relevant at the extremes—where there are few cases in the
dataset. Curvilinearity is unnecessary in the early models because existing levels of politicization
are far more likely to affect future levels in agencies that are already 80 percent political
appointees compared to an agency that is only 20 percent. The results are shown in Graph 11.
While the upper limits of the confidence intervals in the most politicized agencies do cross 0,
none of the coefficients for agencies above 70% SES Politicization are statistically significant.
The only statistically significant margins in the regression were between 20 and 60 percent,
which a only vary by .003 with interlocking confidence intervals, and are not relevant to this
hypothesis. Overall, there is no support for the performance hypothesis using SES Politicization.
Lewis Politicization
I then ran the same tests using Lewis Politicization as my independent variable to test
whether politicization beyond the SES degraded agency performance. Just as before, a positive
relationship between increased politicization in highly politicized agencies would a positive
finding for this hypothesis. Beginning by taking the first derivative of the logistic model, I find
little evidence that increasing politicization at already high levels of politicization increased the
likelihood of OIRA making substantive evidence. The graphical results are in Graph 12. Wide
confidence intervals make it difficult to draw any definite trends, but the confidence intervals
narrow at the highest levels and the coefficients flatten and potentially even begin to curve up.
While this does not definitely confirm the Performance hypothesis, it suggests that further tests

87

could find the predicted relationship. It should be noted that none of the coefficients or even
confidence intervals cross zero so any theoretical performance effect would only be flattening
the curve of politicization’s increasing effectiveness.

For the same reasons stated above, I then imposed curvilinearity on the model using
Lewis Politicization. The results can be found in Graph 13. At low levels of politicization,
increasing levels of politicization produce decreasing likelihoods that the OIRA makes
substantive changes to a rule. These results are statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000 up
to 50 percent politicization. The coefficients between 50 percent politicization and 70 percent are
not statistically significant, but are also not relevant to this test of the effects of politicization in
highly politicized agencies. Agencies with 80-90 have a p-value of .075, which is not statistically
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significant by usual standards, but given the relatively small-n of highly politicized agencies as
classified by Lewis Politicization, it is not inappropriate to draw some inferences from that
margin. The positive coefficients from 90 percent to 100 percent are statistically significant
indicating that increasing politicization has a positive marginal effect on the likelihood of a
substantive OIRA review. These results support the Performance hypothesis.

Even given the earlier negative results using SES Politicization, this result is not
necessarily surprising, nor contradictory. SES Politicization only captures the ratio of political
appointees within the top level of an agency. This is a useful measurement because those top
appoints may be responsible for the bulk of policy making in an agency, but they are also the
positions that are most likely to be politicized by a top-down tool of control like politicization.
As a result, a portion of cases classified as high-levels of politicization by SES Politicization are
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considered moderate cases of politicization under Lewis Politicization. By capturing
politicization’s potential penetration into the lower levels of an agency, cases of extremely high
politicization as categorized by Lewis Politicization are rarer and constitute a massive shift in
agency personnel. In those cases, politicization is removing much of the expertise and
institutional knowledge of an agency, which may be left intact in cases of high SES
politicization.

Discussion
H1: Effectiveness Hypothesis:
The Results
The Effectiveness Hypothesis tested whether agencies with a larger percentage or
proportion of political appointees publish new regulations that are more consistent with
presidential priorities than agencies with fewer. Using a logistic and OLS model of politicization,
I regressed a dichotomous and a continuous measure of the extent of OIRA review on two
different measures of politicization. I find across all measures and models that, on average,
adding political appointees to agencies increases the likelihood that the rules will not be
reviewed by OIRA, which I interpret as greater presidential control over the bureaucracy.
Politicization is an independent contributor to the likelihood of OIRA making substantive
changes to a rule even when controlling for important explanations such as the ideology of an
agency and unified control of government. This finding is in line with a strong literature of case
studies and analysis of federal spending and procurement (Moe 1982; Wood and Waterman
1991, 1994; Stewart and Cromartie 1982; Berry et. al. 2010; Bertelli and Grose 2009; Hubak
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2010). This finding, however, is the first to use a variable that captures the policy content of
individual rules and still be generalizable across federal executive agencies. Previous studies
were restricted to studying the particularities of individual agencies or the disbursement of
federal funding. These findings move beyond the particularities of specific agencies and
moments in time and can tell us that politicization allows presidents to influence how rules and
regulations are written.
A Watchdog Theory
To better understand how politicization extends presidential control, I return to the
principal-agent problem where the president faces three forms of asymmetric information that
weaken his control of the bureaucracy: ignorance of whether bureaucrats’ personal values
contradict with the president’s (adverse selection); a lack of awareness of agency and
bureaucratic activity and whether it is working against the presidential agenda (moral hazard);
and a deficit of expertise (Potter 2019). Given that politicization improves presidential control, it
likely does so by solving one of these problems.
First, politicization is unlikely to narrow the president’s expertise deficit because a key
weakness of political appointees is their lack of subject-area specific knowledge. Second,
presidents may not know the ideological leanings of any particular bureaucrats, but they do know
the general ideological bias of the agency or bureau the bureaucrats work for. While that cannot
fully solve the adverse selection problem by itself, those bureaucrats are as constrained as
political appointees by the institutional culture of the agency and so better information about any
particular bureaucrat’s preferences is probably unnecessary. Additionally, I control for the
ideology of an agency in the model, at least minimizing the adverse selection problem. This
leaves the moral hazard informational asymmetry.
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Political appointees could solve the moral hazard aspect of the principal-agent problem
by acting as a form of presidential surveillance or as an enforcement mechanism. In this theory,
political appointees extend presidential control by acting either as a proxy or an informant who
keeps tabs on the day-to-day activity of career bureaucrats. In the role of a proxy, political
appointees can use their position in the agency to change a particular policy inconsistent with the
presidential agenda. If the political appointee cannot effectively change those policy because the
decision-making process is too insulated from political pressure or they lack the public
management skills to force change, they will act as a watchdog. In that role as a watchdog, the
appointee will report any policy inconsistent with the presidential agenda to someone with the
political power to change it.
Ultimately, I argue that the second scenario is more likely and suggest a watchdog theory
of politicization. Political appointees below the Cabinet level who are chosen for loyalty rather
than their competence likely lack the expertise or experience to consistently be able to
understand and outmaneuver career civil servants who are experts in the procedures of
rulemaking and the topic of the rule itself. Instead, these appointees may turn to high-level
officials like Secretaries or Assistant Secretaries to use the power of their office to change the
rule or they could report it to the president’s staff in the EOP or WHO. This is a tempting
explanation because it further connects presidential mechanisms of control
If the watchdog theory is true, then I would expect that persistent increases of an
agency’s level of politicization will produce rules that are increasingly less likely to be changed
by OIRA. In this situation, the more loyal pairs of eyes observing the policy making process
increases the likelihood that rules are spotted and corrected to fit the president’s agenda before
they are sent to OIRA. This theory matches my results testing for the Performance Hypothesis

92

which showed increasing levels of politicization continuously decreased the likelihood of a
substantive OIRA review until the very highest levels of politicization. While my results provide
some empirical evidence to solve this puzzle, future research should further investigate how
political appointees enforce the presidential agenda in the rulemaking process.
Politicization and Centralization as Substitutes
These results are also the first empirical work to tie together the president’s two primary
tools of control, centralization and politicization, and the findings suggest that they work as
substitutes. While the traditional narrative claims the president has progressively increased the
scope of both centralization and politicization—effectively claiming they are complements—
reality shows a varied use of both across time. Scholars with more expertise in the field have
assumed that the president has a “bounded budget”—i.e. they can only pursue so many
managerial ends at once—which would suggest that centralization and politicization are
substitutes rather than complementary strategies (Nathan 1983; Rudalevige, 2009). Theoretically,
this makes sense—centralizing functions requires political resources and once a function is
centralized, a rational president would not waste some of the limited number of political
appointees available to them on that same agency. Similarly, a heavily politicized agency should
produce rules in line with the presidential agenda—and my findings support this claim—and so a
president is unlikely to use additional resources to centralize their role. Though this relationship
is not a consensus (Moe and Wilson 1994). This theory depends on the assumption that
politicization actually works, that the president trusts his appointees to move agency’s outputs
towards his particular positions.
The Effectiveness Hypothesis provides the appropriate evidence to test this theory. At
first glance this OIRA dataset does not seem to be ideal to study this relationship as all the rules
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included have already been put through an centralized function, but OIRA does not have
unlimited resources to review rules (Bolton et. al 2014). Institutional factors such as available
resources and the staff’s size and competence limit OIRA’s ability to review rules quickly.
Because OIRA technically only has 90 days to review any regulation, those limitations do not
just extend the duration of review, but also make choosing to make a substantive review of a rule
a constrained choice. Given this environment, OIRA review should be thought of as an ongoing
act of centralization in which each rule that they choose to make a change to can be considered
an instance of centralization. Even if this were not the case, larger acts of centralization are
relatively rare and singular compared to politicization so it would be difficult to build a large-n
empirical study outside of this framework.
The negative relationship between both measures of politicization and all three variables
measuring the extent of OIRA action support the substitute theory. This relationship reveals the
president’s extensive set of tools of bureaucratic control as a connected, unified system. While
this may be a logical conclusion of the president as a rational actor, too often scholars analyze
the president’s varying methods of control in isolation. By doing so, we lose the nuance of
presidential decision making. Viewing these mechanisms in isolation, we could understand that
the president may choose to not further politicize an agency because of concerns for performance
as in Lewis (2008). But, by recognizing the relationship between the tools of control, we can
now argue that perhaps he does not politicize to preserve political capital to then centralize those
same duties. Moreover, with this more complete understanding, presidential plans to centralize
are not just contingent on the political arena and managerial concerns as in Rudalevige (2002),
but also the potential opportunity cost of lost politicization.
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This provides a wholistic view of the systems of presidential control—understanding that
the various methods of control are a system, interacting with each and dependent upon each
other. This helps us understand the presidency as institution, rather than a single person.
Understanding the system of the presidency helps explain how President Trump was able to
fundamentally change how the federal government governs sexual assault on college campus and
how President Obama extended that same statute to protect transgender students.

H2: Duration Hypothesis:
The Duration Hypothesis tested whether rules published by more politicized agencies undergo
shorter OIRA reviews. My findings support this claim. Replicating the previous findings with a
continuous variable adds empirical nuance to the model of political control and allows me to
study political control with a more fine grain dependent variable. While the dichotomous
variable OIRA Change provides a strong picture of whether a rule matches presidential
preferences, it likely underestimates how many rules are actually in line with those priorities
because it cannot differentiate between a minor and major changes in a given rule. That
sensitivity holds political appointees to perhaps too high of a standard. In contrast, studying
Duration gives us insight to the extent of the changes done by OIRA by controlling for Previous
Presidential Attention and assuming that rules further from the presidential agenda will take
OIRA longer to review. OIRA is known to prioritize rules that are particularly important to the
president, but controlling for Previous Presidential Attention accounts for that favoritism.
Furthermore, running separate regression for the rules OIRA made changes to and those they did
not, demonstrated the independent effect of politicization on Duration,
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Politicization has an statistically significant negative effect on the duration of review,
signaling that agencies with more political appointees produce rules that are more in line with
presidential preferences. While this test was meant to strengthen the results of my tests using the
OIRA Change and OIRA Severity, it also supports the Performance Hypothesis. If rules produced
from highly politicized are poorly drafted because a lack of expertise, then they should take
longer to fix under review. Duration, however, continued to fall across all levels of politicization.

H3: Performance Hypothesis:
So far, I have established that the president can gain more control over the content of
rules produced by federal agencies by increasing the proportion of political appointees to career
civil servants within that agency. The Performance Hypothesis tests whether adding political
appointees faces diminishing marginal returns—i.e. will adding additional political appointees to
already heavily politicized agencies increase the likelihood of OIRA making substantive
changes. I find support for the Performance Hypothesis, but only in the very highest cases of
politicization. On average, across all agencies, there is no statistically significant evidence of
diminishing marginal returns even when the SES is fully politicized. If, however, political
appointees make up more than 88 percent of all managers within an average agency, additional
political appointees increase the likelihood of OIRA making substantive changes to a rule the
agency promulgates.
Logically, this shift in results at the highest levels of politicization will not come from a
decrease in presidential control that leads to an inability to follow the presidential agenda, but
rather because the agency has lost a critical mass of institutional knowledge, subject-area
expertise, or professionalism needed to produce acceptable regulations. This finding and logic is

96

in line with the bulk of the literature discussing potential performance costs of high-levels of
politicization in agencies (Lewis 2008; Cohen 1998; Heclo 1977; Suleiman 2003; Krause et. al.
2006). This finding is novel because the dependent variable measures whether political
appointees continue to produce rules in-line with presidential preferences rather than measuring
the management, planning, or efficiency of the agency.
These measures ask different questions. The measures found in the literature asks if
political appointees run public agencies well. Given many of those measures use polls of career
civil servants, those authors essentially ask if political appointees are good bosses. In contrast,
my variable tests at what point are additional political appointees not useful to the person who
places them in agencies. The president ultimately cares about making sure that rules are
congruent with the his agenda. My measure uses a higher standard of disfunction, but also better
captures when and why presidents may stop politicizing agencies. I find that at particularly high
levels of politicization, political appointees are not just unproductive, but counterproductive.
These findings also challenge the current literature because rules do not start to shift from
the presidential priorities, on average, until the highest-levels of politicization in our dataset. As
mentioned before, an entirely politicized SES did not lead to less presidential control, nor when
political appointees make up large majorities of the number of managers in an average agency. It
is surprising that scholar’s concerns about appointee’s lack of expertise or public management
experience do not manifest in those cases. Even if these agencies with objectively high levels of
politicization are receiving worse ratings or reviews by employees in internal measures like
Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) and Federal Human Capital Survey (FHCS) as found
in Lewis (2008), they still produce rules that are more in line with the president’s agenda. This
has major implications for presidential management of the federal bureaucracy.
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These results suggest that the president is strongly incentivized to pursue higher levels of
politicization than what would optimize those measures of agency performance. While OIRA
changing a rule is not the only measure of performance or political cost to the president, it the
most basic and perhaps the most essential. Presidents can be hurt by stories of poor agency
management and the inability to retain or recruit top career talent will hurt the state’s ability to
administrate. But, when the president prioritizes loyalty over expertise in their selection of
appointees, they demonstrate, over and over again, that they prefer less capable obedience to
principled competence. It is a choice they have already made and continue to make. As a result,
federal agencies’ ability to recruit and retain the most qualified candidates for career position
will suffer. Long-term degradation of the federal bureaucracy may reach a point that it threatens
agencies’ abilities to respond capably to new challenges. The only thing institutionally
preventing this outcome is Congress’ willingness to refuse presidential demands for additional
positions for political appointees, a resolution that it has not shown historically.
While the political incentivizes point to increased politicization of federal agencies,
trends in the background of political appointees may preserve agency performance. As presidents
have invested greater resources in politicization, they have recognized the value in choosing
appointees who have previous experience in government. Consequently, a system of “in-andouters” has developed where presidents routinely choose people who have repeatedly moved
between the government and the private sector for crucial policy posts (Mackenzie 1987).
Additionally, recent second-term presidents have made a habit of promoting from within to build
a bench of loyalists with experience to later become elected officials or higher ranking agency
officials (Lewis 2008). Appointees in both cases have far more public management experience
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and subject-area expertise than the typical appointee, which mitigates potential damages that
they may have done and protects the capacity of the federal bureaucracy.

Other Findings:
These results also add to a growing literature on agency capture of presidential appointees. Some
scholars theorize political appointee’s loyalty to the president and his ideological program waver
once they actually join an agency (Wilson 1989; Fenno 1959; Bertelli and Grose 2009, 2011;
Ban and Ingraham 1990; Pfiffner 1987). According to these scholars the appointees “switch
sides” because of a variety of factors: exposure to political pressure from Congress or career
bureaucrats; a sense of empathy or connection with their subordinates; or to gain better control of
hostile bureaucrats. In this case, presidents may choose for loyalty among their appointees, but
political appointees’ assimilation into the culture of an agency prevents them from meaningfully
increasing the likelihood rules produced by that agency match the president’s priorities. If this
theory of appointee capture is correct, than adding appointees to an agency, especially in lowpoliticization agencies, will not decrease the likelihood of a substantive OIRA review.
My results reject the appointee capture theory across all models and all variables. The
marginal appointee at low levels of politicizations reduce the likelihood of substantive OIRA
review. The findings for the Performance Hypothesis are particularly relevant here—Graph 13
shows that these first appointees have the strongest marginal effect on the likelihood of OIRA
review. These results fit with the strong trend started by Reagan of prioritizing loyalty above any
other qualifications (Lewis 2008; Weko 1995; Lewis 2011; Pfiffner 1996; Edwards 2001; Moe
1985). Additionally, looking only at the lowest level of politicization provides the most generous
test of the agency capture theory as these are the agencies where political appointees have few, if
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any, allies and are most vulnerable to pressure from below. These results suggest that presidents’
investments in the PPO to find the most loyal candidates has paid off.

Limitations
The major limitations of this study are the lack of measures to control for the complexity
of rules and to gauge the extent of the changes OIRA makes. The complexity of a rule could
influence these results because political appointees are less likely to be able to understand and
influence a technically complex rule and OIRA could be more likely to review a complex rule to
give themselves more time to understand their content. While this phenomena could influence
our results, the variable Duration can function as a proxy for complexity because the OIRA staff,
without subject-area specific knowledge just like the appointee, will take more time to review
these longer, more technical rules. When I controlled for Duration in my Effectiveness model,
however, the coefficient was unchanged. Additionally, complexity is difficult to operationalize;
previous work in the field has used the word count of the rule’s abstract or the total word count
of the final rule to measure complexity. Those are both feasible measures, but long rules can be
written plainly just as dense technical details in a shorter rule could overwhelm a political
appointee. Future research should try to incorporate multiple measures of rule complexity to
account for the multifaceted nature of the variable.
Additional research should also try to capture the extent of changes OIRA makes during
review. My dichotomous variable OIRA Change cannot differentiate between OIRA suggesting
major changes or changing a few lines as both are listed as “consistent with change.”
Unfortunately, there is no public data containing this information. Haeder and Yackee (2018) use
text analysis software commonly used to check for plagiarism to measure how different the final
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text of a rule is from the draft submitted to OIRA. This method would capture whether OIRA
only changed a few lines of text—signifying the rule was almost in line with presidential
preferences—or whether the rule significantly diverged from the presidential agenda and OIRA
had to rewrite significant portions. Unfortunately, this data requires archival research at OIRA to
find the draft rules and Haeder and Yackee’s data is not yet public. Despite this shortcoming, I
created the continuous OIRA Severity to try to capture the extent of disagreement between OIRA
and an agency and the results from that test confirmed my overall findings.
Additionally, future research should examine whether the president adjusts politicization
in response to a history of OIRA review. By setting up a lag variable, researchers could study
whether the president more heavily politicizes agencies which had produced rules that were
changed more by OIRA than expected at the agencies previous levels of politicization. This
research would add to the empirical work that supports the president as a rational actor.
Additionally, it would investigate whether repeated OIRA changes damages the reputation of the
agency, prompting greater political oversight of that agency and testing a key argument of
Carpenter (2002).

Conclusion
This research set out to examine how presidential appointees operate within the federal
bureaucracy—to better understand whether appointees effectively translate presidential priorities
into concrete policy; how presidents may efficiently use appointees; and whether politicization
has diminishing marginal returns. Using empirical methods, I examined the relationship between
political appointees and the use of substantive OIRA review and found that politicization
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projects an independent influence on how agencies write new regulations. I found that
politicization increases the likelihood that an agency publishes rules in line with the presidential
agenda and that there are no diminishing marginal returns on presidential control, until the very
highest levels of politicization.
These findings are part of a rich literature on presidential control of the bureaucracy, yet
they are still the first to test whether politicization is an effective means of control over the
rulemaking process using a set of variables common across all rule-producing federal agencies.
In doing so, these findings link a series of case studies previously disconnected by time and
varying types of agencies (Wood and Waterman 1991; Moe 1982; Stewart and Cromartie 1982;
Ringquist 1995; Scholz and Wood 1998). They also add a new angle to the literature that
demonstrates political appointees’ influence over the disbursement of federal funding and
contracts (Berry et al. 2010; Bertelli an Grose 2009; Hubak 2010). By tying together these
disparate methods and foci, my results provide a more definite picture of how presidential
appointees work across the federal bureaucracy without having to generalize from specific
agency cultures or functions.
There were limitations to this study stemming from the scope and availability of data. In
providing a broad understanding of how politicization works across federal agencies, I inherently
lost some of the nuances of particular agencies such as specific structure, culture, and the
political environment surrounding each agency that previous studies in this field were able to
capture. While the common narrative describes federal agencies as monolithic, few, if any,
agencies across the American bureaucracy are identical, nor are all political appointees the same
(Lewis 2003, 2008).
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But, in many respects, too fine-grained analysis of individual agencies can also obscure
reality. Each agency may have a unique relationship with political appointees and presidential
control, but, in each situation, appointees all face the same basic dilemma: can they produce
outputs that are in line with the preferences of the president, despite potential institutional
impediments. This is true regardless of where the ideology of an agency may lie on the political
spectrum relative to the president or whether the agency has 700 employees or 10,000. The fact
that political appointees, on average and across agencies, are able to affect policy outcomes is a
powerful finding because it describes that common experience. Future studies that incorporate
the nuance of particular agencies or compile a measure for the extent of OIRA’s changes on a
given rule could build upon my findings. That research would provide a richer picture of the how
politicization interacts with agency structure to influence policy outcomes and could inform
presidents of most effective distribution of political appointees.
My results also provide insight on the trade-off between competent administration and
democratic responsiveness that has defined much of the history of political control over the
bureaucracy. Political actors have to choose between guaranteeing that federal agencies’ actions
rigidly serves their political priorities or allowing career bureaucrats use their expertise and
insulation from the demands of the political moment to design what they see as the best possible
rule. All but the most ardent technocrats acknowledges that there needs to be some level of
democratic control over the rulemaking process beyond the legislation which authorizes it. Just
as everyone besides the most committed populist would concede that apolitical professionalism
fulfills a necessary role in administrative government. Yet, bureaucrats have shown countless
times that they are political actors who will act strategically to pursue their own interests,
effectively killing Heclo’s (1975) dream of responsive, neutral competence. If responsive
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neutral competence is not attainable, there must be some form of coercive political control over
the bureaucracy, but a form of control that strikes a balance between providing democratic
guidance and protecting apolitical expertise.
As discussed in the literature review, other potential avenues to ensure bureaucratic
responsiveness and accountability lack the balance or effectiveness of politicization, in theory.
Congress is rarely able to act as a unified actor to exert control over the bureaucracy and if it
manages to, its tools to control the bureaucracy are too unwieldy (Moe 1987; McCubbins et al.
1987; Moe and Lewis 2018; Kernell 1977). The president can centralize to take control over
policy design, but loses most, if not all of the advantages of the expertise and insulation of career
civil servants. Politicization is often framed as a compromise solution, which, at its best,
provides political supervision while also preserving the expertise and experience of career civil
servants and the integrity of federal agencies. At its worse, however, politicization fails to
advance presidential interests and destroys the ability of powerful and crucial institutions to
fulfill their roles and respond to problems because of the ineffective and incompetent amateurs in
charge.
Despite the loss of expertise, centralization at least essentially guarantees democratic
input in the rulemaking process; whereas, politicization risks worse performance without any
gain in democratic influence. If political appointments cannot advance the president’s interests
within the bureaucracy, then they are just patronage opportunities that undermine good
governance and have little argument to exist. Politicization at its best can only exists if it actually
provides the president with greater political control over the bureaucracy.
My results demonstrating that politicization increases presidential control provide
empirical evidence that politicization is not just a viable tool of executive control, but possibly
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the best method to balance neutral competency and democratic responsiveness. Barring an
improbable turn away from governing through rules and regulations, this finding will shed light
on why certain presidential priorities may succeed in the bureaucracy and others fail.
Additionally, these findings will provide some understanding to why presidents may continue to
politicize agencies to the point where performance worsens. But ultimately, my findings provide
general, empirical evidence that politicization can be an effective solution for the central
conundrum of bureaucratic management.
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